# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
## Monterey, California

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# THESIS

**PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT:
SOVIET DECEPTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

by

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March 1988

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

| 1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | 1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS |
|---|---|
| UNCLASSIFIED | |

| 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY | 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT |
|---|---|
| | Approved for public release; |
| 2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE | Distribution is unlimited. |

| 4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) | 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) |
|---|---|
| | |

| 6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION | 6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) | 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION |
|---|---|---|
| Naval Postgraduate School | 56 | Naval Postgraduate School |

| 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) | 7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) |
|---|---|
| Monterey, California 93943-5000 | Monterey, California 93943-5000 |

| 8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION | 8b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) | 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|---|---|
| | | |

| 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) | 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. | PROJECT NO. | TASK NO | WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO |
| | | | | |

11 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
Perceptions Management: Soviet Deception and its Implications for National Security

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
WALTERS, Cathy D.

| 13a. TYPE OF REPORT | 13b TIME COVERED | 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) | 15 PAGE COUNT |
|---|---|---|---|
| Master's Thesis | FROM _____ TO _____ | 1988 March | 113 |

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this Thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

| 17 | COSATI CODES | | 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIELD | GROUP | SUB-GROUP | Perceptions management; Soviet Deception; U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations; Active measures; Disinformation; Propaganda; |
| | | | National Security, Public Opinion, Foreign policy |

19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

This thesis is an attempt to broaden awareness of Soviet perceptions management. Perceptions management activities are designed to influence public and policy-maker opinion unfavorably toward the United States and favorably toward the Soviet Union. The resources devoted to active measures, propaganda, and disinformation extend throughout the Soviet bureaucratic structure and are directed both internally and abroad. Soviet courting of public opinion within a democracy is designed to turn an open political system against itself. If the United States is to function effectively as a democratic role model, an increased awareness is needed of the particular strengths and weaknesses of democracy, along with a rededication to democratic principles. Documentation of lies told to the detriment of democracy

| 20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT | 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION |
|---|---|
| ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS | UNCLASSIFIED |

| 22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL | 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) | 22c OFFICE SYMBOL |
|---|---|---|
| Professor James Tritten | (408) 646-2521 | Code 56TR |

**DD FORM 1473,** 84 MAR

83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete

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#18. SUBJECT TERMS (cont.)

National Security; Public opinion.

#19. ABSTRACT (cont.)

is necessary for the continuing education of the voting public.
This thesis is submitted in the belief that public exposure of
disinformation can contribute to a more balanced consideration
of U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations.

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| Unannounced | ☐ | |
| Justification | | |
| By | | |
| Distribution / | | |
| Availability Codes | | |
| Dist | Avail and / or Special | |
| A-1 | | |

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. BACKGROUND

The study of active measures and disinformation in the United States government and academic circles has been undergoing a resurgence unseen since the 1950s and 1960s.[1] This resurgence was fueled initially by information provided to the US intelligence community, and in Congressional testimony, from Soviet and Eastern bloc defectors who had been involved with disinformation efforts.[2]

The closed nature of the Soviet political system is such that hard, detailed information on the current inner workings of their disinformation effort is difficult to acquire. For this reason, among others, there is a tendency in Western governments to ignore or disbelieve that Soviet active measures are officially endorsed, ongoing, and extensive.

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[1] In 1956, 1960, and 1961, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony on the Scope of Soviet Activity in the US, The Technique of Soviet Propa-ganda, Communist Influence on Anti-nuclear Testing, and Communist Forgeries. Full citations are provided in the government documents section of the bibliography.

[2] Congressional testimony was received in 1959, 1980, 1982, and 1985 on The Kremlin's Espionage and Terror Organizations, Soviet Covert Action, and Soviet Active Measures. Full citations are provided in the government documents section of the bibliography.

Prominent defectors include: Ladislav Bittman (Czechoslovakian State Security, 1968), Arkady Shevchenko (UN Undersecretary General, 1978), and Stanislav Levchenko (KGB, 1979). All of these individuals have made new careers as consultants and educators in the field of Soviet active measures.

Soviet active measures follow five basic themes established in the early days of Bolshevik power consolidation. These themes are as applicable in the 1980s as they were in the 1920s:

- Influence the policies of the target government.

- Undermine confidence in the target government's leaders and institutions.

- Disrupt relations between nations.

- Discredit or weaken internal and external opponents of communism.

- Generate support for Soviet policies and practices. (Godson, 1986, p. 2).

## B.  PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to selectively review Soviet active measures (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) directed towards the United States and United States foreign policy interests.  The hypothesis is that the Soviet Union regularly disseminates information about the United States that is deliberately false or misleading in order to shape the perceptions of others in favor of the Soviet Union, thus furthering Soviet foreign policy goals.

A second hypothesis is that the United States has historically been an unwitting partner in the disinformation efforts aimed against it. This self-deception concerning Soviet foreign policy is due to a combination of widespread unawareness of the utility of disinformation and a willingness to disbelieve in Soviet ulterior motives.  This leads in turn to political activism by those sympathetic to the Soviet cause. The  ultimate result of political activity by democratic individuals and

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interest groups who unquestioningly accept Soviet propaganda is the further shaping of perceptions in favor of the Soviet Union.

I intend to examine the vulnerabilities of a democracy to Soviet initiated disinformation efforts and offer some general proposals for responses to Soviet disinformation as they impact the direction of US foreign policy and survival as a democratic nation.

## C. SCOPE

In a thesis of this size, it is impossible to present in-depth coverage of the existing literature on Soviet disinformation efforts and the response and vulnerabilities of the Western democracies. This thesis is purposefully limited to an examination of the major concepts and practices of Soviet perceptions management in the political field.

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## II.  IDEOLOGY, GOALS AND TARGETS OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT

### A.  INTRODUCTION

Professors Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker have made a useful distinction in the focus of deception studies based on the area of activity and associated target of the deception effort (see Table I).  According to this distinction, deceptive activity may be conducted in either the political arena or the military arena, or in both concurrently.

In the political arena, the primary goal of deception is perceptions management.  Political deception consists of efforts to influence the opinions of policy makers, opinion leaders, and the general public in the West and the Third World.  The desired direction of influence is positively toward the Soviet Union and its policies, negatively toward the United States and its policies.

The second area of Soviet deception is the intelligence arena.  Intelligence deception is designed to affect an opponent's military planning and warfighting capability.  This type of deception is maintained through misdirection of the perceptions, products, and recommendations of intelligence analysts regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities in military and political affairs.[3]

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[3]This thesis will not examine the Soviet practice of *maskirovka*, i.e., military deception.  The Western practice most closely related to *maskirovka* is the military use of camouflage, cover, and denial.  For further information on this area of deception, see:  Notra Trulock III, "The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planning," and Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Soviet Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Deception," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soviet Strategic Deception (Lexington, Mass.:  D. C. Heath and Company, 1987).

TABLE I

**OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DECEPTION**

| Perception Management | | Intelligence Deception | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target: | Decision makers, opinion makers, public, and, to some extent, intelligence analysts | Target: | Intelligence analysts |
| Channels: | Public and private statements by Soviet leaders and negotiators | Channels: | Controlled human sources |
| | Articles in authoritative Soviet journals | | Photographic intelligence |
| | Information made available to foreign journalists and diplomats in Moscow | | Communications intercept |
| | Overt propaganda, front groups, conferences, exchanges, visitors | | Telemetry intercept |
| | Covert press placement | | Other sensors |
| | Forgeries | | |
| | Agents of influence | | |
| Objective: | Influence the opinions and policies of foreign countries by manipulating their perceptions of Soviet activities and objectives. This can be both tactical and strategic in nature. | Objective: | Mislead or distort the analysts' opinions and products relating primarily to military affairs, but also to political and economic affairs. |

Source:  Dailey and Parker, 1987, p. xvii

There is obviously an overlap in the above classification scheme, for that is the nature of deception—it is not a discrete process. Particularly in a democracy, the groups affected by deception efforts exert a reciprocal influence on each other. The analysts are influenced by the policy makers, while the public and opinion leaders influence the direction of political- and military-related foreign policy. This fact is not lost on the Soviets. Reciprocal influence is a helpful

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factor for the Soviet Union in exploiting the vulnerability of the democratic form of government.

## B. DEFINITIONS

The methods most commonly employed in perceptions management include active measures, disinformation, forgery, and propaganda. As Table I indicates, these methods may be utilized by Soviet leaders, their spokesmen, official and nominally unofficial journal or newspaper releases, and sympathetic or unwitting foreign sources. Because the term *perceptions management* covers a broad range of activities, some working definitions are helpful:

| | |
|---|---|
| Active measures | Covert actions taken against an adversary to influence that adversary's behavior in a desired direction or to influence others' views of an adversary's behavior. |
| Propaganda | Overt information which may be either true or false but which is designed to change public or opinion-leader perceptions. |
| Disinformation | Deliberately false or incomplete information designed to change perceptions and influence the behavior of decision makers. |
| Forgery | A particular type of disinformation involving dissemination of printed documents, photographs, or broadcast information which appear to originate from the stated source but which are actually falsely attributed to that source. May be intended for public receipt. |

Successful deception may be either overt or covert in nature. Overt means that the perpetrator of the actions taken is openly acknowledged, while covert means that the perpetrator is hidden. Among those who deal with propaganda and perceptions management,

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such activities are divided into the categories of white, black, and grey propaganda. According to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

> White [operations] are openly attributed and refer to acknowledged government positions, policies, and statements. These include diplomatic, trade and informational programs. Black operations are falsely attributed; they may include planting false stories, surfacing forgeries, and broadcasting radio programs from clandestine transmitters. Grey affairs fall somewhere in between and include the use of front groups, local communist parties, or media manipulation. (US Congress, 1985, p. 48)

When considering active measures, the primary point to remember is that they are most successful when the target remains deceived about the true goals of the perpetrator.

## C. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF DECEPTION

Deception is employed by the Soviet Union for political purposes—to further the accomplishment of Marxist–Leninist ideological goals. General Secretary Brezhnev noted, "On The 50th Anniversary of the USSR," that "the class struggle between the two systems ... will continue. It cannot be otherwise, for the world outlook and class aims of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable." (Lenczowski, 1982, p. 41) As a tenet of their ideology, the Soviets are against any democratic state. Democratic government is incompatible with Marxism–Leninism from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union.

### 1. The Democratic Threat

According to John Lenczowski, former director of Soviet Affairs for the National Security Council, democratic ideals are the true source of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States

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(Lenczowski, 1987, p. 58). Democratic government poses a threat to Soviet security and the leadership positions of those in the Kremlin. Awareness of government by consent, limitations on the power of government, and belief in unconditional human rights all may give rise to demands for the same conditions by those under communist rule. As long as there is at least one democratic power external to the Soviet Union, communist rule is "threatened." The US is emphasized because of the central position it occupies as an example of the longevity and viability of the democratic system of government.

Continued American success in the areas of economics, technology, and global political influence has caused the Soviets to view the US as the "Main Enemy" (*glavnyy protivnik*) and thus the focus for their deception efforts. The easiest way for communists to counter the attractions of democracy is to present democracy as a threat or try to prove that the United States fails to live up to its own ideals. These two arguments are the key to Soviet perceptions management efforts aimed at underdeveloped nations and at the Soviet people.

## 2. Internal Propaganda

The Soviet people are ruled today by leaders who understand the benefits that arise from totalitarian control. The Party uses Soviet historical experience and Marxist–Leninist ideology to justify and reinforce three beliefs about control: (1) the need for the CPSU leadership to maintain a strong authority figure, (2) belief in the inevitability and correctness of communist expansion as a political

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system, and (3) belief in an external threat to the safety and security of the Soviet Union. (Chotikul, 1986, pp. 46-50).

To reinforce belief in the goals of the Party, an internal propaganda program is maintained that provides the people each day with only the information and interpretations which support the behavior and beliefs desired by the Party. The core affirmations of belief are that communism is the optimum stage of human development, that capitalism is inherently regressive and evil, and that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has an infallible scientific knowledge of the actions necessary to ensure the triumph of communism over capitalism.

The continual emphasis in internal communist propaganda on the capitalist threat serves two purposes. First, it keeps antagonism high toward the "aggressive" Western nations, and secondly, it reinforces dependence upon the Party leaders as the authority figures who will resist and "ultimately vanquish" the threatening bourgeois forces.

The Soviet Union has an extremely successful record in the application of internal control over its population. From its inception, the Soviet Union has been a totalitarian society making decisions strictly from the top down, with the express goal of furthering, ostensibly, the development and expansion of communism. Everything that the state does, and every action of its citizens, must be directed toward this effort.

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## D. TARGETS AND GOALS OF PERCEPTIONS MANAGEMENT

The external targets of perceptions management are (1) the United States, (2) other industrialized countries, and (3) the developing countries of the Third World. The emphasis placed on these three target areas may change with the circumstances of differing opportunity or the relative benefit of détente vs. antagonism, but the order remains the same.

The specific objectives of the Soviet Union in its efforts to influence the perceptions and behavior of target governments have been identified as follows:

- To influence both world and American public opinion against US military, economic, and political programs which are perceived as threatening Soviet objectives.

- To demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, colonialist, and imperialist power.

- To isolate the United States from its allies and friends and discredit those that cooperate with it.

- To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world.

- To discredit and weaken US intelligence efforts (particularly those of the CIA) and to expose US intelligence personnel.

- To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

- To undermine the political resolve of the United States and other Western states to protect their interests from Soviet encroachments. (US Congress, 1982, p. 33)

Some of the above objectives are more suited to one target country over another. The emphasis on imperialism is not of much use in Europe or Japan but works well in formerly colonized nations. Also,

the Soviet Union uses different tactics in pursuit of its objectives depending on the political structure of the target government. In the case of Third World or allied countries, Soviet deception is often designed to create the appearance of uninvited US intervention in the affairs of state. In a democratic government, according to the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Soviet active measures are [also] designed to magnify and channel the sincere concerns of non-Communist critics of official Western government policies." (Eagleburger, 1983, p. 9)

## 1. Making Active Measures Work

Although the Soviet Union has an extensive network for developing and implementing active measures, its success depends on the predispositions of the target audience. Those who are either anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet are not the primary targets of disinformation. Those individuals are either too skeptical or already inclined to believe the Party line. The person of greatest interest to a propagandist is the one in the vast middle of the political spectrum who is a potential convert to the cause.

The position of the Soviet Union as a "great power" provides Soviet spokesmen with increased access to Western communications channels. Greater Soviet appreciation of the media role in forming Western opinion has resulted in increased Soviet demands for direct presentation of their viewpoint to Western audiences. However, for Soviet officials to be accepted by a large segment of the population as legitimate spokesmen with a valid message, there has to be a belief in

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their "moral equivalence" when compared with Western spokesmen (Beichman, 1987, p. 78). This assumed equivalence of communist and democratic political systems is supposed to come from the commonality of professed aims. To those unfamiliar with the actual practices of communist rulers:

> The notion that Communists are somehow engaged in the struggle between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, workers and employers, oppressed and oppressors, leads to the persistent notion that Communism is somehow more democratic and progressive than its undemocratic [or democratic] rivals. (Kirkpatrick, 1982, p. 132)

A difference of opinion exists among students of active measures over whether the intention of the initiator is to have the target audience believe the disinformation to be true or whether the intention is to have the target believe in the intended message of the disinformation—that one should be "against US imperialism and for progress" (Beichman, 1987, p. 80). It may be that "the reason that false messages have been so impervious to the truth, is that the identity and the intention of the message sender proves more important to the recipient than its substance and veracity." (Beichman, 1987, p. 80) Beichman's point, that intention is valued above truth, is well taken. Disinformation need not be true to be effective, but it must be plausible enough for its intended message of "Bad US, Good USSR" to be accepted. Once that mindset is achieved, if it can be reinforced through multiple exposures to similar messages, the truth of the information used to convey the message matters not at all. Belief in the "truth" of disinformation, the underlying message, or both, can be counted as a propaganda success for the Soviets.

## E. SUMMARY

Active measures campaigns are designed to further the foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union. The manipulation of information against an adversary is not unusual in foreign relations or limited to the Soviet Union. The Soviet practice is especially worthy of attention, however, because it is systematic, officially viewed as an ideological asset, entrenched in the political and military bureaucracy of the state, and directed primarily against the country which the Soviets have declared to be their main enemy—the United States.

In addition to previous concentration on the issue of Soviet active measures by governmental policy makers and intelligence analysts, research and reporting efforts are expanding into general literature and the popular press.[4] Recognition that disinformation operations occur in two areas—political and military intelligence related—but share to some extent the same targets—the public, policy makers, and intelligence analysts—properly helps to broaden the target audience for awareness efforts.

As the chief representatives of democratic nations, the United States people cannot continue to blind themselves to the ongoing ideological battle. The positive result of initiating action favorable to Soviet foreign policy, through the use of partial truths which subtly change perceptions, makes disinformation a potentially rewarding

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[4]See for example, Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987); Joseph Mauri, "The Great Pretender," Time, v. 128, p. 23, 25 August 1986; Jack Anderson, "Fiction from the Kremlin," Washington Post, v. 109, p. B7, 29 December 1985.

enterprise. It is vitally important that the leaders and peoples of the Western democracies recognize that the struggle for power and influence does not take place just in the areas of military or economic strength but is also a battle of belief and behavior. Some argue that ideology and differences in style between the Soviet and United States governments do not matter. This is a shortsighted and dangerous view, neglecting as it does the expressed intentions and history of communist rule.

During World War II, the US accepted increased military and economic responsibilities among the democratic nations. Just as the US could not avoid involvement in world affairs as a military participant at the end of WW II, the United States and her allies can not avoid the ideological conflict poised by the Soviet Union. Communism is an actively hostile political system, the ideal of which is to subvert democracy altogether. To increase the odds of the survival of democracy, it is necessary to enter the ideological competition and to do so with open eyes.

## III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
## FOR SOVIET DECEPTION

### A. INTRODUCTION

The political structure of the Soviet Union is divided into two hierarchies, a State system and a Communist Party system. The Party system is the older and more important of the two, forming the power base for the Soviet state and providing the principles which direct state policy.[5] Clews (1964, p. 69) stated that:

> To understand the communist political system it is essential to remember the interlocking role of the Party and State in the countries where the Party is in power, in the Communist Bloc itself.... Outside the communist world, we are so used to thinking of the State as something quite divorced from any individual political party that it is difficult for us to adjust our minds, to a different concept.

All of the basic requirements for the functioning of the state are directed and endorsed by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Secretariat (nominally subordinate to the Central Committee) is the 11-member administrative arm of Party leadership, responsible for fulfillment of Politburo directives on all aspects of state management. Subsidiary agencies, particularly the Committee for State Security, the Propaganda Department, and the International

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[5]In explaining how the Party controls Soviet government, Stalin said in 1927: "the Communist Party strives ... to secure the election to the principal posts in the government of its own candidates, ... Secondly, the Party supervises the work of the administration.... It should be added that not a single important decision is taken by them without the direction of the Party." Quoted in Communist Perspective: A Handbook of Communist Doctrinal Statements in the Original Russian and in English (no publication data available).

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Department, are responsible for day-to-day fulfillment of Politburo directives relating to perceptions management.

A brief recounting of the connection between the Central Committee and the spread of communist ideology worldwide will be helpful in understanding the current organization for perceptions management.

### 1. The Relation of the Central Committee to Agitation and Propaganda

Disinformation efforts in the Soviet government can be traced back to the training and employment of agitation and propaganda (agitprop) workers and the use of State Security operatives against the Russian people and emigre community in the early years of the revolution. Lenin's view of political activity was that the masses form 90 percent of the population and should be influenced politically by agitator appeals to their emotions. The cadres, or the 10 percent who form the politically mature population, are to receive propaganda appeals to the mind and be used as the spokespersons for communist ideals and programs both at home and abroad.[6]

During the immediate post-revolutionary period, spokesmen for the Central Committee were directed through the Department of Agitation and Propaganda for internal audiences and through the Communist International (Comintern) for external audiences. The

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[6]In his famous distinction, G. V. Plekhanov stated, "the propagandist conveys many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator conveys only one or a few ideas, but to a great mass of people." Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd. ed., v. 1, p. 137.

Comintern existed from 1919 to 1943 to keep communists worldwide abreast of the foreign policy themes and objectives desired by the Soviet Union. The Comintern also demanded and received foreign communist party support for various measures. The primary responsibility of the Propaganda Department (as it is currently known) was to educate Soviet citizens in Party ideology and to control cultural creative expression. Although the Comintern was "dissolved" to placate Allied protests of subversion efforts against their governments, it was rapidly followed by the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) organization of European communists, which lasted from 1947 to 1956.

Under the direction of the Central Committee, the above organizations provided for ideological education and control of persons who were either believers in the communist system or had no means of escaping it. There was still a need for contact and influence of other foreigners. In 1943, shortly after the dissolution of the Comintern, the Central Committee formed a Foreign Affairs Department to address this need. According to Schapiro (1976-77, p. 42), the Foreign Affairs Department was divided in 1957 into three parts:

> 1) a Department for Relations with Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries, which controls the bloc; 2) a Department for Cadres Abroad, closely linked to the KGB, which is responsible for the instruction of foreign cells of the CPSU, that is to say cells inside foreign missions [embassies], ... 3) the core and mainspring of the Foreign Affairs Department, the International Department.

The CPSU Central Committee has been directly involved from the beginning of the Soviet state with the formulation and

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dissemination of information that selectively expresses the goals and intentions of the Party. Despite statements to the contrary, however, the Central Committee no longer has first-line approval authority for propaganda campaigns.[7] Endorsements of propaganda themes by the Central Committee occur after the fact of their development, not before.

## B. POLICY SETTING

Tables II and III provide a basic representation of the Party hierarchy for the development and employment of active measures by the Soviet Union. The current policy organization for active measures is as follows:

### 1. Politburo

The true seat of policy and decision-making power in the CPSU is the Politburo, a 10-13 member board of Party elites currently under the direction of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Western observers of the Soviet political system believe that

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[7]The Party line concerning the current relationship of the Central Committee to the propaganda effort was discussed recently in a publication by the Moscow Institute for Social Science entitled Social Psychology and Propaganda:

> Propaganda planning is a necessary condition of successful propaganda work. This planning is obligatory at all levels from the highest central apparatus of the party down to the local cells ... The Central Committee of the CPSU determines the basic tasks of party propaganda; its decisions are directive in their nature.

Quoted in Roy Godson, Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast , no. 3, Summer 1986, p. 8.

Policy decisions regarding the use of propaganda and covert action are made at the apex of the Soviet political system, in the Politburo. The Politburo approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda campaigns and the means used to implement them. (Congress, 1980, p. 61)

Richards Heuer, a former CIA officer, has noted that "the Politburo role is not limited to approving deception plans implemented by others. Rather, official statements by Politburo members themselves play an important part in achieving Soviet deception goals." (Heuer, 1987, p. 25)

## 2. Central Committee

The Central Committee is the means by which the Communist Party maintains the false appearance of democratic rule by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Membership in the Central Committee fluctuates between 325 and 350 Party members, with meetings for Party Congresses held every five years. When the Central Committee meets, it is more of a policy-endorsing body than a policy-debating congress in the democratic sense. Central Committee Congress voting results have invariably followed expected endorsements of platforms formulated by the exclusive Politburo membership.

## C. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Under the administrative control of the Secretariat, are the three agencies involved in the direct implementation of active measures campaigns approved by the Politburo: the International Department (ID), the Propaganda Department (PD), and the Committee for State Security (KGB). Any of these organizations may submit recommendations for specific programs to carry out the active measures goals directed by the Politburo.

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TABLE II

## POLICY SETTING STRUCTURE

| CPSU Politburo |
|---|
| General Secretary: Gorbachev<br>Party Secretary for Propaganda: Yakovlev<br>Politburo Member In Charge of KGB: Chebrikov |

| CPSU Central Committee |
|---|

| CPSU Secretariat |
|---|

| International Department (ID) | Propaganda Department (PD) | Committee for ɔtate Security (KGB) |
|---|---|---|
| Head: Dobrynin<br>Asst: Korniyenko | Head: Sklyarov<br>Asst: Vlasov | Head: Chebrikov<br>Service A: Ivanov |

Source: US Congress, 1980, p. 61

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## TABLE III

## POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE

| Propaganda Department (PD) | International Department (ID) | Committee for State Security (KGB) |
|---|---|---|
| Tass and Novosti | Non-ruling Foreign Parties | First Chief Directorate |
| Radio Moscow | Front Organizations | Service A (Active Measures) |
| Pravda and Izvestia | National Front Affiliates | Embassy Residencies |
| Progress Publishers | World Marxist Review | Department 11 (Bloc liaison) |
| Embassy Public Relations | Soviet Academy of Sciences | Department 12 (Covert spokesmen) |
| | | Second Chief Directorate |
| | | Journalist and Student Recruitment |
| | | Tourist Monitoring |
| | | Embassy Personnel Recruitment |

Source: Congress, 1982, p. 229; Baron, 1983, pp. 443-451

In 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the Soviet Union spent more than $3 billion dollars each year for propaganda efforts by the International Department, Service A of the KGB, media outlets under the control of the Propaganda Department, and in support of front organizations and agents of influence (Congress, 1980, p. 60). Recently, Robert Gates, the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, stated that the level of support was now in the $3 to $4 billion range, and the CIA "has seen no evidence that the level of Soviet activity has lessened in recent years." (Congress, 1985, p. 4) Although comprehensive figures are closely guarded by the KGB,

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Director Gates went on to estimate personnel allotments for Soviet deception organizations as follows (Congress, 1985, pp. 4-6):

| | |
|---|---|
| Service A | 700 officers in Moscow and abroad |
| International Department | 150 to 200 officers in Moscow; 25 officers in Western Europe |
| Diplomatic Corps | Approximately 233 are intelligence officers |
| News Agencies | 70 to 80 percent are intelligence officers |

### 1. International Department

The traditional responsibility of the International Department is to maintain liaison with communist parties in power in the Eastern bloc, Cuba, and China, and with non-ruling communist parties abroad. The ID supports Soviet primacy among communist parties abroad through ideological guidance published, for example, in the monthly journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review); through funding for non-ruling communist parties; and through liaison with the international departments of other ruling communist parties. In this respect, the ID evolved from the Comintern and Cominform.

As the "core and mainspring" for foreign affairs, the ID is "something much more important than a routine department for relations with [other] communist parties." (Schapiro, 1976-77, p. 43) The International Department

> coordinates and reviews inputs on foreign policy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB, Ministry of Defense, and the foreign policy research institutes under the Academy of Sciences, such as the Institute of the USA and Canada, and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.... The research institutes themselves are also

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tasked regularly to conduct studies for the ID and to dis-
seminate Soviet views the ID wishes known in the West.
(Heuer, 1987, p. 27)

According to defector reports, Cuban and Eastern bloc nation Interna-
tional Departments are responsible for parallel deception measures in
support of Soviet themes and operations. (Bittman, 1972; Golitsyn,
1974)

Through its International Organizations Section, the ID is also
responsible for the coordination and funding of international fronts.
These groups "are more effective than openly pro-Soviet groups
because they can attract members from a broad political spectrum."
(State Department, October 1981, p. 2) Front organizations generally
claim to be politically neutral, but their active support for pro-Soviet
foreign policy aims and their discernable alteration of position in
response to changing Soviet pronouncements indicate that they are
committed to the expansion and goals of communism. The increased
use of international front groups and national friendship societies in
support of Soviet policy will be examined in the section on deception
channels.

### 2. Propaganda Department

As shown in Table III, the Propaganda Department controls
all official sources of communication from the Soviet Union, including
Pravda, the news agencies TASS and Novosti, and Radio Moscow,
among others. In addition to filtering news of Soviet events to the
West, the Propaganda Department controls the way events in foreign
countries are reported to the Soviet people.

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The controlled flow of information into or out of the Soviet Union is deliberately designed to support the propaganda aims of the CPSU. The degree of press control in the Soviet Union makes it clear that the Soviet press does not maintain an adversarial relationship with the government. The attitude of communist leaders towards their press organizations is that the press exists to serve the foreign policy goals and internal ideological interests of the Party. Information appearing in press outlets is overtly designed to show the USSR in the best light possible and to show the US and its allies in the worst possible light.[8]

According to a CIA spokesman (Congress, 1982, p. 61), the International Information Department was established in 1978 to "reorganize the entire foreign propaganda apparatus, improve its effectiveness and open a new propaganda offensive against the West." An alternate explanation for the founding of the IID, now the Propaganda Department (PD), has been given by former KGB intelligence officer Stanislav Levchenko:

> While it is true that the IID [PD] has responsibility for improving the timing, responsiveness, and coordination of the major propaganda channels of the USSR, this function was seen as necessary for internal audiences first, and foreign audiences second.... Furthermore,

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[8]According to a 21 Nov 85 _Pravda_ article, propaganda workers must "Vividly and convincingly display socialism's advantages and true values, and reveal the exploitative essence of capitalism, with its unemployment and inflation, with its large illiterate and homeless population, with its preaching of racism and chauvinism." Quoted in Ebon, _The Soviet Propaganda Machine_, p. 412.

the IID [PD] does not set propaganda themes. This is more the responsibility of the ID. (Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 176)[9]

### 3. Committee for State Security (KGB)

The primary tasks of the KGB are espionage against foreign governments, maintenance of internal security, and counterintelligence against foreign efforts to uncover Soviet state secrets. Involvement in covert deception activity, i.e., active measures, serves to support those primary tasks.

In 1959, active measures were conducted by the newly formed Department D (for *dezinformatsiya* or disinformation). Soviet bloc intelligence agencies were also required to establish parallel organizations within their state security forces. For the first time, disinformation became a long-range policy requiring the cooperation of all governmental agencies and Soviet intellectuals (Golitsyn, 1984, p. 49). By 1964, the reach of Soviet intelligence expanded greatly through the formation of an "integrated intelligence system" which gave the USSR direct control of bloc disinformation activities. (Sejna, 1986, p. 76)

After undergoing a name change and elevation in status from the department level, Service A (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya* or active measures) was unveiled in 1970. The steady increase in bureaucratic standing of the active measures organization within the KGB provides a

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[9]Additional support for the seniority of the ID over the IID is provided by a 14 June 1981 speech to the Central Committee by Konstantin Chernenko in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, 15 June 1983, v. III, p. R15.

clear indication of the value of the operations it conducts (Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 37).[10]

As Table III indicates, Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) is primarily responsible for the implementation of covert active measures programs decided upon by the Politburo. For the purpose of conducting deception operations, the KGB

> has its own facilities for production of forgeries, fabrications, and literature of disguised origin. An entire section of the Novosti press agency is reserved for the Service's personnel, and the Academy of Sciences accommodates a goodly number of them in its humanities divisions. (Barron, 1983, p. 447)

When the KGB wants to infiltrate an organization requiring specific skills— such as a newspaper or a religious group— the KGB will either provide an agent with training or make use of a person in the organization who can function as an agent of influence (Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 162). Agents of influence are individuals with credibility and access to target groups who (1) may not be aware that they are being used to support a pro-Soviet position or (2) consciously use their influence to assist the policy goals of the Soviet Union. The benefit of using the agent of influence is that this person's political activity "promote[s] the objectives of a foreign power in ways unattributable to

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[10]An additional indicator is provided by Congressional testimony on the growth of Service A. In 1970, Service A had 40-50 officers, but in 1980 the estimated figure was 200. (US Congress, Soviet Covert Action, 1980, p. 10)

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that power," providing he does his job well. (Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 19ʊ)[11]

The actual work of spreading disinformation is accomplished by the Active Measures officer assigned to a particular foreign embassy. The Active Measures officer is generally a senior individual who can assign other KGB officers and their agents to a particular disinformation operation. The assistance of the local communist group and/or front organizatioɴ is available and has usually been coordinated through the International Department (Barron, 1983, p. 447).

The second major element in KGB implementation of active measures directives is Departments 11 and 12 of the First Chief Directorate. These departments are used for the channeling of disinformation and propaganda rather than espionage. Department 12 officers work undercover within Soviet government institutions as journalists, academicians, trade union personnel, or ordinary tourists. Their role is to act as spokespersons for Soviet foreign policy goals with those whom they contact as "peers," gather intelligence useful to the government, and be on the lookout for foreigners who may be candidates for positions as agents of influence. Department 11 officers are responsible for the supervision of Eastern bloc intelligence service active measures operations. (Barron, 1983, pp. 449-450)

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[11]Interesting details on the management of agents of influence may be found in Ladislav Bittman's <u>The Deception Game</u> (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972); and the Levchenko and Bittman interviews in <u>Dezinformatsia</u>, 1986, pp. 160-181.

The third major element in KGB active measures operations is the Second Chief Directorate (SCD). Although this large Directorate provides the operatives who act as the internal political police, the SCD also fulfills other roles. Operatives of the Second Chief Directorate are responsible for (1) monitoring the daily activities of foreign journalists and recruiting them to the Soviet cause, (2) working to co-opt foreign diplomatic personnel, (3) supervising the management of tourists visiting the Soviet Union, and (4) determining which Soviet citizens may travel abroad. Through close contacts with foreigners visiting the USSR and restrictions on which Soviets foreigners may meet in their own countries, the SCD plays a central role in affecting foreign perceptions of the Soviet Union.

### 4. Changes to the Propaganda Team

In the fall of 1985, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council stated that:

> The Gorbachev regime plainly is more astute than its predecessors in manipulating public perceptions. In their public dealings, both Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have already demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how to use the Western media. Moreover Gorbachev seems to be preparing to revamp the Soviet propaganda apparatus. (Congress, 1985, p. 7)

Although the general outlines of the Soviet propaganda apparatus have not changed, there have been some important changes in personnel and technique. These changes are the most far-reaching since the 1978 improvements that ushered in the International Information Department.

During the March 1986 27th Party Congress, General Secretary Gorbachev announced the replacement of Leonid Zamyatin as Chief of the IID [PD], by Aleksandr Yakovlev, and the renaming of that organization as the Propaganda Department. This change seems to have taken place in July 1985. Yakovlev concurrently became the Party Secretary for internal and external propaganda (Counterpoint, v. 2, no.1, p. 2). In June 1986, Yakovlev was promoted to full–fledged membership in the Politburo and relinquished his oversight of day-to-day Propaganda Department operations to Yuri Sklyarov, former editor of the World Marxist Review (Counterpoint, v. 2, no. 5, p. 1). Yakovlev has ten years' experience living in the West, which should be beneficial in his supervision of media outlets for Soviet propaganda.

The other organization to undergo a major change in leadership near the time of the March 1986 Party Congress was the International Department. Anatoly Dobrynin became head of the ID after the retirement in February 1986 of Boris Ponomarev. Ponomarev had run the International Department for 30 years.

Dobrynin is believed to be the guiding force behind the modernization of ID/PD/Foreign Ministry cooperation in propaganda efforts and has a great deal of experience in recommending successful disinformation themes to the Kremlin (Counterpoint, v. 2, no. 4, p. 6). A former Soviet Ambassador to the United States for 24 years, Dobrynin is the one senior Soviet official with hands–on experience of American culture. His experience is especially valuable in the areas of democratic press and political systems. In the words of Kathleen

Bailey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Active Measures Analysis, "any time you know how a machine works, you can tinker with it." (Bering-Jensen, 1986, p. 27)

The reorganization of the Propaganda Department and the International Department at the top leadership level has had repercussions throughout the Soviet print, publishing, and broadcast media. Soviet spokesmen no longer have the boorish appearance and manners of the 1960s but could pass for suave Europeans or Wall Street executives. The Soviets are also changing their propaganda tactics, placing more emphasis on person-to-person exchanges with influential Westerners and their Soviet counterparts. The emphasis is on presenting an image to the world of a modern and moderate power which is open to criticism from its intelligentsia, non-dogmatic, and only interested in peaceful coexistence with its neighbors in a nuclear-free world.

## D. SUMMARY

All available evidence indicates that the Soviet practice of perceptions management is an endemic policy that crosses the boundaries (in the Western viewpoint) of State and Party, security organizations, and institutions of foreign policy. As Kennan observed years ago, communism is a political system that requires a monolithic government, a government that will accept no other organization besides its own. Whatever the course decided by Party elites, the State must follow. Under a communist system, the State exists only to support and advance the Party. The government of the USSR and the CPSU are one and the same.

As the bureaucratic structure of the CPSU expanded, the leadership structure of a small group of supporters gathered around a central authority figure became insufficient. It became necessary to create a network of organizations, each fulfilling a particular role. Internally, the International Department, Propaganda Department, and KGB all serve to reinforce the centralized system of authority, educate the people in communist ideology, and monitor their compliance with Party rules. Externally, they serve as a means to engage in ideological and intelligence warfare with the West.

Perceptions management has been referred to as "psychological war waged against the free world by the Soviet Union and its allies." (Casey, 1985, p. 1) Keeping in mind that successful perceptions management activities are designed to hide the perpetrator's intentions from the target, the majority of methods used in deception do not appear related to warfare at all. The realization that war has been declared, for all practical purposes, only comes when the historical statements and actions of the Soviet Union are examined in light of their intentions and successes in replacing democratic systems of government with communist ones. As long as the cornerstone of communist aggression is an antagonism toward democracy, and as long as the Soviet perception is that they are the injured party rather than the aggressor, efforts to manipulate Western perceptions toward a favorable outlook on the Soviet Union and its policies will not cease.

# IV. DECEPTION CHANNELS, THEMES, AND CAMPAIGNS

## A. DECEPTION CHANNELS

Successful deception requires more than the public and private statements of Soviet spokesmen or official announcements in government publications. In order to positively influence the perceptions of others about the Soviet Union and generate negative perceptions about the United States, other deception channels are utilized to spread the particular message selected in Moscow. Deception channels may be information sources, organizations, or individuals, some clearly under Politburo direction, and some less obviously influenced by the Politburo.

In general, each deception operation involves individuals or organizations fulfilling three separate roles:

> The Operator—author and conductor of an operation; The Adversary—this can be a foreign state as a whole, its ruling authorities, or even individual citizens.... The Unwitting Agent—a game player who without being aware of his true role, is exploited by the Operator as a means of attacking the Adversary. (Bittman, 1981, p. 215)

During the course of exchanges between the Operator and the Adversary, there is an audience of onlookers. It is important to realize that these onlookers are also targets of active measures. The intent of the Operator is for these target onlookers to form negative perceptions of the Adversary, either because of the content of the Operator's message or because of the response of the Adversary in efforts to defend his position. This paradigm works in cases where exchanges

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occur directly between the Soviet Union and the United States, but the pattern also holds when the disinformation is not delivered to an American audience but is intended for US allies or a Third World audience. In this case, the real or imagined actions of the Adversary form the subject matter of the disinformation.

One of the most profitable ways for the Soviet Union to increase the number of "Unwitting Agents" available to meet its objectives is through the use of channels known as front organizations.

### 1. Front Organizations

The history of front organizations predates World War II, beginning in 1921 with a group known as International Worker's Aid. The founder of this group was Willi Munzenberg, the principal organizer of early Soviet efforts to gain sympathetic audiences of "fellow travellers" who would spread pro-communist propaganda.[12]

> Worker's Aid was able to mobilize people and money among humanitarians of varied political hues. It was a gigantic fund-raising operation that utilized many methods that have, since then, become widely accepted. Munzenberg pioneered the use of prominent personalities, artists, and writers in mass meetings and appeals.... Worker's Aid was able to function where the Comintern was under suspicion, and where Communist parties were therefore suspect or illegal. (Ebon, 1987, pp. 57-59)

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[12] According to the State Department,

> In Leninist theory and practice, front organizations are "transmission belts" whereby elements of the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) are presented to non-communists who may already sympathize with or support similar policies, but who are unwilling to accept the entire program of the CPSU or submit to party discipline. (US Department of State, Foreign Affairs Note, July 1984, p. 1)

After WW II, front organizations became more professional, learned to utilize mass communication, and made use of the post-war euphoria and strengthening Soviet political position to establish friendship societies. The general pattern was to establish a group that was proclaimed to be non-partisan but which over time came to be more and more directed by a communist leadership.[13] In some cases, this resulted in a split among the membership, with some individuals forming organizations of their own to address the original concerns of the group without Soviet influence. (Clews, 1964, pp. 96-98)

Some of the more well-known and active front organizations are the World Peace Council (1949), World Federation of Trade Unions (1945), World Federation of Democratic Youth (1945), Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (1957), and Christian Peace Conference (1958) (Rose, 1985, pp. 52-55). Table IV lists other organizations functioning as communist fronts, such as special organizations for women, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and journalists. No stone is left unturned in the search for a sympathetic and malleable audience.

Because the Soviet practice is to exploit any discontent or cause for protest among the "masses" (at all socioeconomic and

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[13]In December 1960, the CPSU issued a New World Plan in which cooperation with non-communist groups was addressed in this way:

> While ensuring that the communists retain the leadership at all times, greater use is to be made of the peace movements, the youth, student and trade union groups and women's groups to exploit all possible sources of discontent, joining forces where possible with social democratic and labour groups for tactical ends. (Clews, 1964, p. 60)

educational levels), a group may engage in activism which benefits the Soviet cause without being a front organization per se. According to former KGB agent Stanislav Levchenko,

> The trick is to make people support Soviet policy unwittingly by convincing them they are supporting something else. Almost everybody wants peace and fears war. [The Soviet message is] that whatever America does endangers peace and that whatever the Soviet Union does furthers peace. (Barron, 1982, p. 4)

Front organizations may be divided into two categories: (1) long-standing international front organizations with affiliates in various countries, and (2) smaller national organizations which tend to be based on the model of friendship societies (Clews, 1964, p. 95). The "platform" of front organizations may be designed around any issue of interest to a particular group, but certain themes have predominated over the years.

The current principal themes of Soviet front organizations are peace, nuclear disarmament, demilitarization of space, national liberation, and friendship. The problem with espousal of these themes by front organizations is not that the proposed actions are necessarily bad but that the demands for action (generally immediate) are all directed toward the West, to the exclusion of bilateral action on the part of the Soviets.[14] Front organizations also deliberately ignore, or

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[14]According to Ebon, "To be for peace, in terms of Soviet propaganda efforts, has always meant to be against something, usually an undertaking, a project, or a policy of the United States, often merely identified as "the imperialists" (which could include the NATO countries or other nations)." (Ebon, 1987, p. 78).

deny the harm of, Soviet actions that play a major role in preventing genuine attainment of positive goals in international relations.

The only way to determine whether a particular organization is a front group is through observation of its actions, particularly in response to changing Soviet foreign policy interests. One-sided attacks against the foreign policy of Western nations, changes in pronouncements or programs that parallel those of the Soviet Union, investigation of funding sources (perhaps via the local Party), and the presence of communist members on the governing bodies of their boards are all indicators of a front organization. With the exception of the first two conditions (one-sided attacks or pronouncement changes), the relevant information is generally well hidden or denied.[15]

### a. World Peace Council

The World Peace Council (WPC) became known by its current name in 1950. It was preceded by the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace in 1948 and the World Committee of Partisans for Peace in 1949. Headquarters of the WPC have variously been in Paris (1949-51), Prague (1951-53), and Vienna (1954-57), but, due to expulsion from those cities for actions against their governments, the WPC has been headquartered in Helsinki since September 1986.[16]

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[15]For further information on fronts, see Clive Rose, Campaigns Against Western Defense, 1985; John C. Clews, Communist Propaganda Techniques, 1964; and James L. Tyson, Target America, 1981.

[16]For an 11-year interim period, the WPC went undercover in Vienna as the International Institute for Peace.

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The WPC has affiliates in 142 countries, publishes the Peace Courier and Disarmament Forum on a monthly basis, and conducts World Peace Assemblies generally on a three-year schedule. (State Department, April 1985, p. 2)

TABLE IV

**TEN MAJOR SOVIET INTERNATIONAL FRONTS**

| Front | Founded | Headquarters | Affiliates |
|---|---|---|---|
| World Peace Council (WPC) | 1950 | Helsinki | 142 |
| Christian Peace Conference (CPC) | 1958 | Prague | 86 |
| World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) | 1945 | Prague | 90 |
| Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) | 1945 | East Berlin | 129 |
| International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) | 1946 | Brussels | 64 |
| International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) | 1946 | Prague | 114 |
| Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) | 1957 | Cairo | 91 |
| International Union of Students (IUS) | 1946 | Prague | 118 |
| World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) | 1946 | London | 33 |
| World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) | 1945 | Budapest | 210 |

Source: (State Department, August 1983, pp. 3-41; Spaulding, March-April 1986, p. 73)

As the premier front organization of the Soviet Union, the WPC has been instrumental in sponsorship of disarmament-related activity such as the Stockholm Appeal of March 1950, which demanded a ban on nuclear weapons, and a follow-up in June 1975, urging continuation of détente and an end to the arms race (Rose, 1985, p. 250). Additionally, the WPC has sponsored conferences on European security via the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation, organized activity against US involvement in Vietnam, supported protests against the neutron bomb and for a nuclear freeze, and is currently active in protests against the "militarization of space." (State Department, April 1985, pp. 4-5)

Soviet control of the WPC has occasionally caused dissent within the ranks, especially among the representatives of Eastern bloc countries and the membership truly committed to bilateral efforts for peace and human rights.[17] Internal protest against the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 resulted in replacement of some senior members of the WPC Presidential Board, and the 1969 Assembly in East Berlin was the occasion of protests against tight delegate and press control. Delegate demands that "the Soviet Government grant amnesty to

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[17]Noncommunist peace groups, such as the Bertrand Russell Foundation, are heavily criticized by Soviet officials for attempts to remain nonpartisan and contact Soviet citizens who wish to do so also. In 1983, the editor-in-chief of Pravda stated that the Soviet Union had no such thing as an "independent peace movement," and that those who claimed to be independent were trying to "assert their private, personal interests, and ... are abusing the emotions for peace, the longing for peace." (US Department of State, Foreign Affairs Note, April 1986, p. 6)

political prisoners, and ... bring to light those forms of repression practiced in the U.S.S.R." were met with derision by the pro-Soviet leadership of the WPC (State Department, April 1985, p. 2). As a result, the World Peace Council has lost much of its status as a guiding light among peace groups. What makes this less of an occasion for complacency is the fact that the WPC has spawned a number of subsidiary peace organizations. These subsidiaries do not have readily apparent ties to the Soviet Union and continue to attract new members.

The most recent WPC Assembly took place October 15-19, 1986, in Copenhagen, Denmark. This assembly was the first held outside a communist country since 1965 and was not a successful forum. Although the WPC is recognized by the UN, the Secretary General declined an invitation to speak at the Assembly opening ceremony. Social Democrats in Denmark largely boycotted the event, the opening ceremony was marred by protesters who displayed signs calling it a "KGB Peace Congress," and protesters demanded to address Soviet actions such as the Afghanistan invasion and Soviet failure to live up to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. (Counterpoint, v. 2, no. 8, January 1987)

Permission to attend the 1986 WPC Assembly was tightly controlled and resulted in the expected endorsements of Soviet aims such as "abolition of military blocs like NATO, the removal of US bases from Europe, and support for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua." (Counterpoint, v. 2, no. 8, January 1987, p. 4) The success of

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protesters in taking over the podium on the final day led to an early closing of the assembly without a final official statement being made. The majority of the newsworthy action surrounding this fourteenth World Peace Congress Assembly occurred outside of the conference hall. The previously unquestioning supporters for Soviet propaganda are beginning to find their own voices.

## 2. Friendship Societies and Concerned Citizens

One of the elements of professionalism which the Kremlin has introduced into its active measures campaigns is the use of "concerned Soviet citizens" available and eager to discuss the folly of United States policy with their peers in the West. While these citizens are supposedly relating their own private points of view, they are directed by the International Department toward a variety of influential groups and professional associations. The initial contact is usually a sophisticated professional effort, offering the opportunity for "open" discussions which develop into attacks on US policy with little to no criticism of the policies of the Soviet Union. (Counterpoint, v. 2, no. 6, November 1986)

Friendship societies differ from international front organizations in that they have a more localized orientation, stressing "people-to-people" contacts and avoidance of "political" discussions for an emphasis on day-to-day concerns. The effort in this case is intended to strengthen the perception of the ability of ordinary citizens to transcend the bureaucratic limitations of their governments and reach

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personal understandings that will eventually be reflected in friendlier exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West.

The use of ostensibly "private citizens" as spokespersons gives Moscow increased access to a broad range of social groups. Local governments, religious groups, independent peace activists, and emigré groups are all targets for what has been referred to as "the new detente." The benefit to Moscow is that "once organizations or individuals become involved in 'bridgebuilding,' breaking down 'stereotypes,' 'preventing wars,' and so on, it becomes more difficult to criticize the Soviet bloc." (Godson, 1987, p. 14) If contact can be made with individuals who have the basis for a common interest, removed on the surface from politics, then the door is open for more formalized relations. Relations which are intended to be favorable for Moscow at the expense of Washington.

The belief—correct though it is—that the arts, the environment, and athletics are areas of common interest to all people regardless of political affiliation is handily used by the Soviet Union to expand its influence among people who want to do their share in improving relations between the superpowers.[18] What the average

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[18]An interesting lesson may be learned from one independent effort to make contact on the local level without prior coordination via Soviet representatives: A peace group in Maryland requested sister-city status with a town in Latvia, sending official greetings and personal good wishes, only to hear no response for two years. Finally, the group was told that they had erred in their request because their town was too small and they had failed to make their request through Soviet authorities outside the local Latvian bureaucracy. Questioning the delay and the apparent lack of interest in friendly relations, a little research turned up a more probable reason for the refusal of a sister

Western participant rarely realizes, however, is that there can be no such thing as an "ordinary" Soviet citizen allowed to visit a democratic country. The Soviet representatives met by Western citizens have been thoroughly screened by the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB:

> The 11th Department approves and regulates the travel abroad of all Soviet citizens, except senior Party members and persons in sensitive positions. It scrutinizes the background and circumstances of each prospective voyager ... Ordinarily, either a staff officer or a part-time agent of the Department accompanies each departing group. His reports on the behavior of the travelers become a permanent part of the dossiers kept on every Soviet citizen who ever has been abroad. (Barron, 1974, p. 82)

The fundamental error of Western belief in the utility of exchanges between what are represented as two groups of concerned citizens is that only the citizens of the Western nations play a role in the determination of state policy. Free elections do not exist in the Soviet Union, and citizens who openly disagree with CPSU policy are persecuted as state enemies. Satellite television links and cultural exchanges may increase understanding of a different cultural and political system, but they are insufficient to effect change in a political system that does not allow the impetus for political change to flow from the public to the politicians.

### 3. Soviet and Western Media

Although General Secretary Gorbachev has accused the West of unleashing "psychological warfare ... a special form of aggression; of

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*Continued from previous page*

city relationship—the "claim to fame" of Rezekne, Latvia, is the local KGB prison camp. (Counterpoint, v. 2, no. 10, March 1987, p. 2)

information imperialism" (Shevchenko, 1986, p. 3), he requires from communist cadres

> a devoted Party attitude, a consistent class approach to assessing current events and phenomena, political vigilance, intolerance of views that are alien to us. (Shevchenko, 1986, p. 8)

This duality of approaches is characteristic of the Soviet world view and is a primary factor in the success of the International and Propaganda Departments in spreading the Soviet view around the world.

The international news media is one of the most useful channels available to the Soviets for disinformation purposes. In order to conduct successful propaganda, the Kremlin relies not just on Soviet reporters but on foreign journalists as well. On one level, Soviet media disinformation is conducted by Soviet correspondents based overseas, by radio broadcasts originating from the Soviet Union or satellite countries, and by official print media originating in Moscow. On another level, Soviet disinformation depends greatly upon the information provided to foreign journalists in Moscow, "clandestine placement of a media item in a foreign news outlet, or the selective replay of an article which originally appeared in a foreign publication." (Shultz and Godson, 1986, p. 35)

### a. Soviet Journalism[19]

When considering disinformation that originates from official Soviet sources, it is crucial that Western audiences realize that

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[19]From the vantage point of American experience, journalism does not exist in the Soviet Union. The term is used throughout for the sake of convenience.

Soviet journalists are restricted to providing only news which has been approved by the Party.[20] The state censorship bureau (Glavlit) must approve the text of every Soviet news story, radio program, or television program (even those obtained via exchange with the West), and monitors journalistic output to insure that no changes are made.[21] *Glasnost* does not extend to deviations from the officially provided news viewpoint. Nicholas Daniloff has reported that:

> nothing suggests rapid lifting of the Kremlin's historic control of the message. The more sophisticated theme may no longer be that Soviet Society is perfect and that of the West uniformly evil.... But the changes are for perfection of the state system, not concessions to the West. (Daniloff and Trimble, 1986, p. 36)

Many Western observers have noted that, within the past four years, the appearance and behavior of Soviet spokesmen reflect a decreased Soviet emphasis on ideological rhetoric and an unveiling of

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[20]An additional role of the Soviet "journalist" may be as an agent or cooptee of the KGB. This role is discussed in Chapter III, by Barron (1983), and by Levchenko in Shultz and Godson (1986), among other sources.

[21]In 1983, a Soviet announcer was removed from his position with Radio Moscow and sent to a psychiatric clinic for using the following phrases in his reporting:

> The Soviet Union has said once again that it is not prepared to work to secure constructive decisions on limiting nuclear arms in Europe ...

> ... the Soviet Union wishes to have more missiles and warheads ... than NATO has.... the struggle against the Soviet invaders ... antigovernment activity carried out from the Soviet territory endangers the security of the population of Afghanistan.

According to a spokesman from Radio Moscow, his reinstatement to a nonbroadcast editorial position occurred because, "He was ill, but now he has been cured." (Ebon, 1987, pp. 282-284)

spokesmen who look and sound more Western. David Powell, a Soviet specialist on the Party media, says that today's spokesmen are "much more nearly what Americans are accustomed to, and what Americans readily identify with." (Dailey, 1987, p. 419) According to defectors (Bittman, Shuman, Senja) who have experience in disinformation policy and practices, the intent of this change is "to sell a suave, 'liberal' Gorbachev image to the U.S. public and to the NATO allies." (Gulick, 1986, p. 72) Should this method of positively influencing perceptions about the USSR prove unsuccessful, more traditional methods are available.

### b. Soviet Manipulation of Western Journalism

One of the reasons for the ease with which the CPSU manipulates Western perceptions about the Soviet Union is strict control of access to information by foreigners. Journalists are often not bilingual and so must depend on Soviet-provided translators or press releases. Audiences with Soviet officials in Moscow occur on an invitation-only basis and are highly sought after. Reporters who probe too deeply may find themselves shut out of the information chain or detained and then expelled from the country (Brock, 1986). When a journalist enters the Soviet Union, he or she is there by permission and must play the information game to a large extent by Soviet rules.

Television may be considered the media of choice among Americans, and is popular among developed nations in general, but the traditional vehicles for Soviet propaganda have thus far remained print media and radio broadcasts. This is especially true for propaganda

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directed toward Europe and the Third World. Radio broadcasts to developing countries are a wonderful disinformation tool because there is generally no way for the listener to check the veracity of the information. Moscow often disguises its broadcasts as "organs of authentic local 'progressive' forces," with messages designed to meet its own ends. (US State Department, 1981, p. 2)

The most widely studied form of Soviet media manipulation is the printed forgery. Forgeries generally have certain characteristics in common: "anonymous surfacing, technical and linguistic aberrations, news value and timeliness, and contribution to Soviet policy and propaganda goals." (US State Department, April 1983, p. 2) The CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence has explained that, "while efforts are first made to surface forgeries in the establishment European press to give them greater credibility, they often end up first either in the Third World or leftist European press." (US Congress, 1985, p. 13)

The lasting benefit of a forgery is that it may be used over and over again, because "once published it assumes a credibility of its own." (US State Department, April 1983, p. 2) After being surfaced by a friendly journalist, the news item may be picked up by a more influential paper, giving the USSR the chance to reference and redistribute the item as originating in the West. This ruse can be made to work even if the second mention of the forgery was a refutation. If the Soviets are able to surface a forgery in noncommunist media, "this enhances the credibility of the disinformation operation and provides

more believable sourcing for replay by communist media." (US State Department. May 1984, p. 3)

The demands of their profession make journalists particularly susceptible to Soviet control of their information sources and the attraction of readily provided "news" in the form of a forgery. In the modern world, information is equated with power and journalists are power brokers. Despite the power of journalists as opinion leaders, disinformation planted in the Third World or the West would have little power to alter public and policy-maker opinion if the themes used by the Soviets did not strike a responsive chord among the audience.

## B.  DECEPTION THEMES

The specific objectives of Soviet perceptions management listed in Table I are impossible to reach without well-developed themes which can be transmitted for consumption in the West. Active measures themes may be transmitted overtly by numerous individuals, ranging from front organization spokesmen, to Soviet journalists and academicians, to Soviet political leaders themselves. What advances the positive perception of Soviet goals most, however, is when the "facts" of disinformation themes become "common knowledge" among the groups to whom various ideas are targeted. As the Soviet Union successfully alters the perceptions of what is proper or what is true among the peoples of the world, it will matter less and less to those who are unaware what the true facts actually are.

The themes of Soviet propaganda are designed to affect two different areas of perception among the target audience. First targeted is the perception of the intent of Soviet foreign policy. The second target is world perception of the foreign policy intentions of the Western democracies, particularly the United States. The following are submitted as the most important and misleading themes underlying Soviet deception efforts.

## 1. Evolution of the Soviet State

According to Lenczowski, the "principal theme of Soviet strategic deception is to convince the West that the Soviet Union is not Communist any more." (Lenczowski, 1987, p. 57) It is in the best interests of the Soviet Union not to appear to the West as a threat, therefore possibly facing increased political and military resistance to its foreign policy practices. The leaders of the Kremlin would rather be seen as a modern nation, a partner superpower with the United States, that by right influences world events in equal measure. The first step in the effort to convince the democratic governments of Soviet evolution is to blind those governments to the role of communist ideology in Soviet foreign policy.

### a. Communist Ideology Does Not Determine Soviet Behavior

If the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is no longer directed by Marxist-Leninist ideology, then certain conclusions follow. The first conclusion Soviet propagandists want democratic peoples to reach is that communist ideology does not determine Soviet behavior.

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The West should believe that the Soviets have no intention of spreading communism throughout the world, the Soviet Union does not orchestrate the actions of the Eastern bloc and Cuba, and the Soviets would be willing to settle for a division of the world into US–led and Soviet–led spheres of political influence. Basic knowledge of the communist political program would identify these "conclusions" as false. The coexistence of democracy with communism does not meet the ideal world view of Marx, Lenin, or the current occupants of the Politburo. Temporary adjustments to the reality of such coexistence may be made, and may even be proposed as good public relations, but the thrust of the Soviet political evolution is for worldwide socialism under strong Kremlin leadership.

An additional benefit for the Soviet Union, if political ideology is no longer the reason for poor US-Soviet relations, is the opportunity to create a different reason for poor relations. The Soviets would have the West believe that the US-Soviet conflict is based on differing economic systems or standard state territorial politics. The intentions are (1) to foster belief in an equal measure of guilt for negative consequences to others as both countries try to extend their influence; (2) create a view of both sides as symmetrical (in modern parlance: "The Russians are just like us."); and (3) to make the rest of the world's countries believe that they can remain neutral in the superpower conflict.

In actuality, the major conflict is between democratic goals of freedom and the communist practice of dictatorship. The

US/Soviet conflict is not exclusively between economic systems, because Eastern bloc deviation from the Soviet program is more readily tolerated when the deviation is economic than under any other circumstance. Additionally, the Soviet Union is able to incorporate capitalistic practices or seek to benefit from capitalism when such actions will be beneficial. The Soviet Union seeks to increase its economic influence as much as the US does— the economic systems just happen to be different.

Lastly, standard territorial acquisition for security is not the issue, because the Soviets have never been satisfied with their borders as they are, either under monarchy or communism. (Labin, 1960, p. 23)

### b. Moderates vs. Conservatives in the Kremlin

The second conclusion disinformation channels provide in the "evolving Soviets" theme is that Kremlin leaders must face the same political infighting that characterizes the policy-making process of the United States and Europe.[22] If Kremlin leadership is composed of moderates who want to take a "live and let live" position with the West and conservatives who would rather continue to strive for communist political and military dominance, then the West is "obliged" by morality and good sense to continually make appeasing overtures toward the moderate faction.

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[22]This particular argument is believed by some to have been first suggested to the Kremlin by then-Ambassador Dobrynin in concert with Georgiy Arbatov, who is now Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada. (Counterpoint, v. 2, no.4, p. 6)

In actuality, differences of opinion do exist among the Kremlin leadership, but they are more differences of degree rather than kind. The Soviet leadership is much more able to present an unified political front to the West. Not only is it expected but it is a basic requirement for survival within the Party. The only dissidents in the Soviet Union are not, and have no chances in the near future of ever being, decision makers.

This idea of viewing the senior Soviet leadership as mirror images of Western bureaucrats is what leads to such great Western expectations when a new General Secretary is appointed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The West rapidly forgets that there is only one political party in the Soviet Union and that no man emerges as the Party leader unless he has a long and loyal history in that organization and is approved by it.

## 2. US-Soviet Tensions Are the Fault of the West

The "evolving Soviets" argument proposes that communism versus capitalism is not the reason for US-USSR tensions because the Soviets are no longer limited by the narrow confines of ideology. A second argument provides the "answer" that East-West tensions are the result of Western aggression. Supporters for this argument propose that the Soviets have a history of being defense oriented because they fear attack in general, and attack by the West in particular.

The first aim of this argument is to maintain the ideological myth of aggressive "capitalist encirclement" which supports the continuity of the regime internally. This reasoning falls apart when you

examine the record of economic assistance and cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union and the record of Soviet aggression against neighboring and far-flung states. From 1939 to 1941 and from 1946 to 1949, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was clearly expansionist. The same pattern continues today. One student of Soviet behavior has said, "If they are overarmed it is first of all because militarism is the necessary prop and climate of every dictatorship ... and because they do have aggressive designs." (Labin, 1960, p. 24)

The second aim of the argument that the Soviet military posture is defensive is to generate doubt among democratic leaders and the Third World concerning the intentions of the United States toward the Soviet Union, and by extension all other sovereign states. If the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, as the targets of active measures are to believe, then the arms race _and_ the threat of nuclear war _and_ the expenditure of funds for defense to the detriment of efforts to improve the quality of life are all the fault of the "aggressive imperialists."

The fact is that any Western move to defend against Soviet arms buildups is labeled as aggressive, and any political move to support a country which resists communist encroachment, or to draw attention to such expansionism, is denounced as starting the "cold war." The Soviet practice has continued to be as Colonel-General Agayants, head of Service A, directed:

> We must constantly encourage Western journalists to write precisely the opposite of our real intentions and anyone who writes or speaks about our real intentions accurately or impartially in the Western

sense of these words must quickly be dismissed and ridiculed as someone of the Right or a fascist, someone who wants to bring back McCarthyism. (Freemantle, 1982, p. 131)

The situation today is that the Soviet Union has been successful, through the use of disinformation and deliberate support of what Western leaders and the public would wish to believe, in turning the perception of which intentions belong to what system upside down.

### 3. The USSR is Against Nuclear Weapons and For Military Balance

One of the most important deception themes of the Soviet Union is the ongoing campaign to present itself as a peaceful, defense-oriented nation that desires arms control and the establishment of a nuclear free world.[23] The parallel message of this theme is that the United States is for the use of nuclear weapons and against

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[23]For further information on deception and the antecedents of the current arms control situation, the reader is directed to Brian D. Dailey, Deception and Self-Deception in Arms Control: The ABM and Outer Space Treaties Reconsidered, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, August 1987; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, Has Soviet Nuclear Strategy Changed? Report No. P-7181 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, December 1985).

superpower parity.[24] The actual Soviet doctrine on war does not match the message of this theme.

The Soviet view of why war occurs and the role it would play in future wars may be summarized as follows: War is inevitable because of economic strains within the capitalist system; war will last as long as capitalist states survive; capitalist states, as their power declines, will attack communist states, probably with nuclear weapons; but communists are sure to win in the power struggle against the capitalist system because communism is the best form of government. (Lee and Staar, 1986, pp. 24-25)

Under this system of beliefs, only four types of war are considered possible: (1) Wars between capitalist and communist states, (2) wars of national liberation between underdeveloped countries and their former colonizers, (3) internal civil wars between the disenfranchised and the powerful, and (4) wars between capitalist states.[25] The only type of war which communist ideology considers just is a war to

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[24]It cannot be denied that one reason why the United States is at a disadvantage in this argument is because it is the country which successfully generated a nuclear explosion and the only country to have ever used a nuclear device as a weapon. Regardless of the concurrent efforts of the Germans, Japanese, and Soviets to develop an atomic bomb; regardless of any possible benefit of the bomb in saving lives in WW II that would have been lost through further conventional warfare, and the peaceful uses to which nuclear power can be put, there is a great deal of guilt and blame surrounding US use of the atomic bomb.

[25]In the case of civil wars, students in Soviet military academies are taught that Marxist-Leninist ideology demands active support to "turn the democratic revolution into a socialist one." (Scott and Scott, 1984, p. 67)

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defeat capitalism—waged either by peoples seeking independence from capitalist rulers or by a socialist state. (Scott and Scott, 1984, pp. 66-67)

Between 1953 and 1960, the Soviet leadership developed the basic tenets of the warfighting doctrine it adheres to today. It was decided that the objective of war was victory, which meant: (1) maintenance of Party control, (2) defeat of the capitalist countries and their alliances, and (3) limiting damage to the Socialist Motherland. (Lee and Staar,1986, p. 35) Accordingly, "the essence of Soviet military policy is to attain the forces required by its doctrine and strategy, the final objectives of which are to be prepared to fight and win wars at all levels, including a nuclear war." (Lee and Staar, 1986, p. 2)

One of the "forces" available to the Soviet Union is deception, which is used to the utmost in presenting a public face for its nuclear doctrine that is at odds with statements published for internal consumption by the Soviet military and political elite.

In 1956, Premier Khrushchev declared that nuclear war was no longer "fatally inevitable" because of the deterrent effect of the growing Soviet atomic arsenal. From 1962 through 1968, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovskiy, expressed the Party leadership belief that "the creation and constant maintenance of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy in [the nuclear arena] ... represents one of the most important tasks of construction of the armed forces in the contemporary epoch." (Lee and Staar, 1986, p. 29)

The Party emphasis in the 1950s and into the early 1970s on survivability, superiority, and victory in nuclear war became a political liability in the age of detente and arms control.[26] It seemed necessary for the Soviets to formulate a declaratory policy that would accommodate "preferred Western images of deterrence, parity, and stability." (Lambeth, 1985, p. 10) Brian Dailey points out that, during the period of détente, Soviet censors were involved in removing references to Soviet military superiority from the open press. The results were such that, "by 1973, Soviet writings on military strategy had begun to limit statements on not only superiority but also the discussion of the nuclear aspect [of military affairs]." (Dailey, 1987, p. 386) In 1977, General Secretary Brezhnev formalized this practice by indicating that the USSR was not interested in military superiority, or preemptive nuclear strikes, and that it was uncertain that nuclear war was winable. While later Soviet military sources have deemphasized Sokolovskiy's adherence to nuclear superiority for the purpose of fighting a nuclear war, the emphasis and pursuit of Soviet military superiority over the West remain.

The timing of what has come to be known as the "Tula Line" is interesting for various reasons. First, the speech was made just days

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[26]Reference works for the new nuclear strategy include: Nikita Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet, the October 1961 speech to the 22nd Party Congress by Minister of Defense Malinovskiy, and the 1962 text of Military Strategy by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovskiy. Excerpts from the above works are found in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).

before the inauguration of President Carter. Second, the IID was formed less than a year later to better coordinate Soviet propaganda channels. Third, discussions of Soviet military intentions in everything from Pravda to the Military Encyclopedia began to follow the moderate line of Brezhnev's speech within the year. Since then, Soviet propagandists have organized support for "no-first-use" campaigns, touted the "obsolescence" of the Sokolovskiy texts on military affairs, and stressed the need for the West to respond favorably to Soviet moderation. (Dailey, 1987, pp. 392-393; Lee and Staar, 1986, pp. 29-34)

Disinformation about the Soviet position on nuclear war is so pervasive and requires the coordination of so many of the decision makers and resources available to implement deception that the history and support effort for this theme could well serve as the archetype of perceptions management operations. The next section will highlight the evolution and current status of Soviet perceptions management efforts through peace propaganda.

## C. DECEPTION CAMPAIGNS

The first point to be aware of in peace propaganda is the difference in meaning between the Soviet and Western definitions of *peace*. When Soviet officials speak of peace, they know that it has both an overt and a covert meaning. Soviet leaders employ a language called "Sovietspeak" with its own particular grammar that is designed for addressing different audiences:

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> The grammar we are discussing has at least five voices: (1) for
> speaking to foreigners ...; (2) for speaking to other elite Leninists;
> (3) for speaking to the Soviet and other captive peoples; (4) for
> speaking to free people; and (5) for speaking to the Third World.
> (Bathurst, 1987, p. 94)

Sovietspeak is "that language used by the secret governmental struc-
ture whose voice is that of the utopian myth." (Bathurst, 1987, p. 104)
In the Soviet Union, the past and the future are emphasized much
more than the present reality. The past is emphasized to selectively
establish a precedent for the current practices/conditions of the state,
while the future is emphasized as the occasion of the worldwide dicta-
torship of the proletariat, in the name of which current sacrifices are
being endured. The present is a dangerous subject for discussion
because of the discrepancy between the promise of communism and
the living conditions of the people under its rule.

When Soviet spokesmen refer to peace, on the covert level they
do not mean conditions of mutual friendship and cooperation among
different political systems as in the sense of the Western definition—
"internally, a state of domestic order, and externally, equilibrium and
an absence of war"; the Soviet concept of peace is expressed as:

> ... a condition in the world in which socialism, the first stage of
> communism, had triumphed worldwide, class tensions had thus
> been removed, and the conditions for true peace under Communist
> leadership had come to pass. (Nitze, 1984/1985, pp. 363-364)

The interim stage before the "peace" ushered in by worldwide
Soviet leadership or rule by an extended network of satellite govern-

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ments is what has been referred to as "peaceful coexistence."[27]  The phrase meant to Western politicians that they could live side by side with the Soviets, putting aside not only the fear of armed conflict but also the "cold war" ideological struggle.  For the Kremlin leadership, peaceful coexistence meant something entirely different.  Peaceful coexistence for the CPSU is an occasion for intensified ideological struggle and an offensive against defense efforts in the West.  It is a chance to encourage "a condition of lack of resistance to Communist forces or Communist operations."  (Ashbrook, 1982, p. ii)

The second point to be aware of in an examination of Soviet activity in relation to the peace movement is the degree of secrecy with which such dual meanings are treated.  None of the above information is allowed to come to light among those the Soviet Union seeks to use in weakening the West and advancing its own foreign policy.  As far as relations are concerned with those who are not initiates in communist ideology, or communist-ruled peoples, only the overt level of communication may be employed.  The direction given to communist agitators in 1953 is no less applicable today:

> The communist agitation programme is to be carried out by means of the "peace" campaign and "peace" is to be used as the principal theme to justify whatever local communist interests demand.  In

[27]Peaceful coexistence is a campaign announced by the CPSU in its December 1960 New World Plan.  The genesis of the plan was a secret conference held in November 1960 among 81 of the world's 86 communist parties.  The benefit of peaceful coexistence would be "an intensification of the struggle ... for the triumph of socialist ideas ... helping towards world communism without the need for war." (Clews, 1964, p. 60)  The West referred to its later interpretation of what it thought peaceful coexistence meant by the term détente.

particular, all attempts to build up any organization to resist the possible use of force by the Soviet Union must be prevented. A particular agitation is to be conducted against defence arrangements made in co-operation with the Western Powers. (Clews, 1964, p. 78)

The first peace campaign launched by the Soviet Union after the wartime alliance with the United States and Britain was the Stockholm Appeal of 1950. This effort was spearheaded by the newly created World Peace Council, which was more successful than previous front organizations with more narrow activist platforms. With the war just over, many people were eager to support an effort to bring peace and try to control the awesome power of the atomic bomb. The Stockholm Appeal called on governments to "Ban the Bomb" and was successful in generating millions of signatures from nations around the world. The WPC claimed to have generated 500 million signatures of individuals anxious to prohibit atomic weapons from existing in weapons stockpiles, yet the petition drive abruptly ended in 1953 when the Soviet Union detonated its first thermo-nuclear device.[28] (Pincher, 1985, p. 200)

The Stockholm Appeal is important in the annals of Soviet active measures, and activism in general, for three reasons. First, it demonstrates the potential for activism rising out of the genuine concern

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[28]Regardless of the fact that the US was willing in 1946 to submit to direction by an international Atomic Development Authority, the Soviets pushed for a full ban and would not agree to uninvited on-site inspection by a third party. The USSR had been studying the potential for building an atomic bomb of its own since 1942, actually beginning nuclear weapons research in March 1943. (Calvocoressi, 1982, pp. 5-9; Holloway, 1983, pp. 15-20)

that exists among people who are faced with what they view as a threatening situation. When presented with what they are told is a solution to that perceived threat, people respond. Second, it demonstrates the purely selfish motives that give rise to Soviet involvement in an issue when the Politburo sees its desired margin of safety threatened by the United States. Third, it clearly points out the Soviet practice of encouraging a positive movement for its own ends, as long as those ends are being accomplished. The Stockholm Appeal provides a model, in all of the particulars above, for the peace offensives which were to follow.

## 1. The Anti-NATO INF Campaign

David Yost has used the available data on the Soviet four-year anti-NATO campaign as a case study of efforts to influence the decisions of Western policy makers in directions beneficial to the Soviet Union.

When NATO members announced their approval of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) missile placement in December 1979, and called for concurrent arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for elimination or reduction of INF missiles on both sides, this signalled to the Soviets a willingness on the part of NATO to "make and implement defense decisions" that could have disturbing consequences in their direction and degree of cohesiveness. The deployment of INF missiles was sought in order to reduce European anxiety over Soviet SS-20 INF missiles which were deployed within striking

distance of Europe in early 1977. (Yost, 1987, p. 344; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1983, p. 2)

From December 1979 to November 1983, the Soviet Union directed its attention to an effort to stop the deployment in Western Europe of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. Soviet efforts were centered on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) because of West Germany's host-country status for the majority of US troops in Europe, leadership in gross national product, and premier position in conventional forces among US European allies.

The Soviet Union was unsuccessful in halting the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles, but their propaganda campaign received a great deal of attention and pointed out successes in some areas that may be useful in efforts to stop the Strategic Defense Initiative. Kenneth Adelman, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), called the Soviet campaign the "most intense and well orchestrated effort since the founding of NATO." (ACDA, 1983, p. 1)

The tactics used by the Soviet Union against the NATO decision included:

- Combining peaceful declarations with threatening statements.

- Playing upon pacifism.

- Portraying the West— in sharp contrast to the Soviet self-portrait— as the obstacle to both disarmament and a reduction of international tension.

- Seeking to persuade public opinion in the West to believe that their own government's actions responding defensively to Soviet power and conduct are instead provocative of a Soviet response and that the Soviets are the aggrieved party, reluctantly forced to consider or pursue countermeasures.

- Carefully staging some rare opportunities for "news" from Moscow, gaining access to millions of readers in the Western democracies.

- Granting rare interviews with foreign correspondents, to insure an audience for Soviet views. (ACDA, 1983, pp. 1-2)

Through consistency and constant pressure, the Soviets were successful in getting Socialist and Social Democratic parties to endorse key issues, generating the development of opposition parties who openly proclaimed a pro-Soviet line, obtaining public sympathy for the Soviet view of "equal blame" for both superpowers as to why previous arms talks failed, and spreading the point of view that "the deployments are being carried out against the will of the people and are therefore illegitimate." (Yost, 1987, pp. 345-346) As a result of the tactics listed above, and the success in strengthening opposition parties in Europe, three lasting achievements were made possible:

1. Polarization of political parties, resulting in disunity among decision makers,

2. Delegitimization of the US role in protecting Western Europe and directing arms control efforts,

3. A common socializing experience for many European youths who do not feel the same gratitude toward the United States as earlier generations and who are more in favor of neutrality. (Yost, pp. 345-346)

The combination of overt and covert material, tailoring of themes to fit the expectations and weaknesses of the audience, and alternating between conciliatory and threatening behavior are all

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classic disinformation ploys. What remains interesting is the difficulty in interpreting how much of the anti-NATO activity was due to Soviet influence during the anti-INF campaign, how much was due to intra-Alliance and internal German concerns, and how much was due to previous Soviet "reality management" that took place from the mid-1960s up through 1979. The emphasis on peaceful coexistence and détente at this time led to a set of expectations, chief among which was that the military buildup of the USSR could be ignored while emphasis was placed on viewing the Soviets as fair and reasonable. The Soviets of course supported this "wishful thinking," but Western governments were equally responsible for only attending to that which they wished to see. When the pendulum swung back, and the West noticed the balance of military power in Europe definitely shifting towards the Soviets, it was an emotionally and politically wrenching experience to recognize the new reality. In balance,

> peacetime perceptions management ... may be able to structure and cultivate perceptions far in advance for exploitation on a later occasion. The hypothesis may exaggerate the degree of conscious Soviet complicity with Western wishful thinking and self-deception during the era of detente, but—however crudely—it seems to account for many of the facts. (Yost, 1987, p. 367)

## 2. The Anti-SDI Campaign

The Soviet campaign against the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) resembles the 1979-1983 anti-INF campaign in the use of the same tactics to influence perceptions of US and Soviet intentions. The current arms control disinformation campaign also differs from the earlier INF effort in certain ways. First, the anti-SDI campaign

benefits from an established infrastructure of front organizations and peace activists who are receptive to Soviet overtures. Second, the Soviets are more experienced in the use of Western communications channels as forums for their point of view. Also, there are higher stakes involved in this campaign for the USSR if the movement to halt SDI research is unsuccessful.

Regardless of the fact that SDI is only in the research stage, the offer by the US to share the technology of SDI if it proves feasible, and the characterization by the President of SDI as a "search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war," the Soviets have not responded to SDI as a military challenge which they can meet or in which they have an inherent advantage (ACDA, 1986, p. 2; Stevens, 1986, p. 697). Sayre Stevens believes that

> the Soviets see SDI as a basic challenge to their accomplishments in matching the strategic might of the United States and in projecting that image to the world at large.... If the Soviets are to take advantage of their momentum and steadfast pursuit of military programs, they need stable and predictable competition. SDI is a disturbing complication.... SDI also poses a type of head to head technological competition that the Soviets have avoided in the past and seem to fear. (Stevens, 1986, p. 698)

### a.  Soviet Anti-SDI Arguments

According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the arguments posed by the Soviets against SDI are a combination of long-standing propaganda themes and new points particular to the SDI campaign. The arguments are that: (1) SDI is a first-strike system; (2) SDI is destabilizing, making arms control negotiations difficult and starting an arms race; (3) SDI will lead to the

militarization of space; (4) SDI is a violation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic
Missile Treaty; (5) SDI is technically infeasible; and (6) SD' will be too
costly. The last two points are ones which the Soviets acquired by
virtue of using arguments first made by those within the US who ques-
tion the merits of SDI. (ACDA, 1986, pp. 5-12)

Responses to three of the arguments listed above serve as
examples of the one-sided and deceptive nature of Soviet disinforma-
tion in efforts to meet their political needs:

1. SDI is "destabilizing." A Soviet spokesman said of SDI that it "is
another attempt to disrupt the strategic military parity between
the USSR and the United States." (ACDA, 1986, p. 7) As noted
previously, parity between the USSR and the US was never a
stated concern for the Soviets until the period of détente in the
mid 1970s. In fact Soviet propaganda operates under the
assumption that "U.S. military programs always "upset" the bal-
ance, while Soviet military programs always "maintain" the bal-
ance." (ACDA, 1986, p. 7)

2. SDI Violates the ABM Treaty. Marshal Grechko said to the
Supreme Soviet in 1972 that "The ABM Treaty does not place
any limitations on carrying out research and experimental work
directed towards solving the problems of defence of the country
against nuclear missile attack." (Pincher, 1985, p. 232) An obvi-
ous question then follows that, if it is permissible for the Soviet
Union to do research in advanced ABM methods, why not for the
US? The only possible reason is that the Soviet Union would
prefer to restrict US advancement while at the same time they
"protect the advantages earned through their massive invest-
ments in passive and active forms of strategic defense." (Yost,
1985, p. 289)

3. SDI Will Cause the Militarization of Space. The Soviet Union
tested the first anti-satellite weapon in the late 1960s. In 1977,
the US began ASAT research in response. Only the Soviets have a
working space-based anti-satellite system. Available evidence
indicates that militarization of space is a problem for the Kremlin
only when it is not unilateral.

The coordination of anti-SDI statements by Soviet leaders, government spokesmen, and representatives of front organizations provides some insight into the importance of this particular campaign in the overall program of strategic deception. According to the CIA, the purpose of the anti-SDI campaign is to

> limit President Reagan's political flexibility in dealing in bilateral discussions and arms control negotiations. Its tactical goals are designed to mobilize opposition to President Reagan's defense program—and particularly SDI—among our allies and in our country. This campaign attempts to bring the widest range of economic, moral, political and international pressures to bear on the President in an effort to force him to restrict some or all of his SDI program. (Casey, 1985, p. 4)

The anti-SDI campaign is the latest peace and military balance disinformation effort in the history of Soviet disinformation campaigns against the United States. The Soviet Union has been successful in focusing the attention of the public and the media, as it tries to do for all disinformation campaigns, on the activities and intentions of the US rather than itself. The anti-SDI campaign can be expected to continue into the foreseeable future, with renewed pressure on the US and her allies as the election of a new president approaches.

## D. SUMMARY

The Soviet Union not only has a large organization for the creation and direction of deceptive activity but the organization is supported by numerous channels of information, all relaying the same themes in support of pro-Soviet campaigns. The combination of media manipulation efforts, appeals to desires to make a positive contribution through fronts and friendship societies, and deception themes that

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appeal to Western beliefs provides a formidable support network for successful Soviet perceptions management.

Through the use of front organizations and formal cultural exchange, Moscow is able to spread the pro-communist point of view among a widening group of people, not just the "politically active." Whether the spokesman is a government bureaucrat, a journalist, a scholar, or an individual visiting the West for a person-to-person exchange, its purpose is to foster a positive image of the Soviet Union. If a negative image of the United States or Western practices is implied as a result, so be it.

Each time a Western practice can be placed in a negative light, through the use of half-truths or complete falsehoods, those who practice Soviet foreign policy can avoid the spotlight. The name of the game in deception is to create doubt and negative feeling towards the adversary while discussing your own practices as little as possible. Evolution of the state, supposed Western responsibility for the tense relations between the superpowers, and proclaimed Soviet readiness to abandon a nuclear defense all serve as enticing arguments to keep the ignorant or unwary from closer examination of the past practices and future intentions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet efforts to be seen as "just one of the larger countries in Europe," with the same concerns and desire for goodwill as the rest, are continuing misdirections away from the more difficult issues of communist ideology, domestic conditions, and foreign practice. Efforts against intermediate-range nuclear forces or the

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Strategic Defense Initiative are the latest and some of the most specific of Soviet campaigns against Western democracies and in support of the foreign policy interests of the USSR. The general themes supporting a positive view of Soviet policies and a negative view of US policies are just as important as specific efforts which come and go. As situations change, campaigns of deception change also. What does not change is the intended message.

## V. <u>WESTERN RESPONSE TO DISINFORMATION</u>

### A. DEMOCRATIC VULNERABILITY

One of the most important questions in the study of Soviet deception is the degree to which democratic governments are susceptible; specifically, to efforts to advance Soviet foreign policy while frustrating the foreign policy goals of democracies. The Soviets understand that the key to success in deception is found within the structure of democratic government. In addition to the failure of Western governments to heighten public awareness of the deception threat, three factors are proposed as sources of democratic vulnerability to Soviet deception: the open nature of the democratic system, Soviet ability to exploit weaknesses in democratic government, and differences in the way Americans and Soviets view the world.

The openness of democratic governments and the strong influence of public opinion on policy are extremely helpful in Soviet perceptions management efforts. The degree of public participation in policy formation is a major obstacle to countering disinformation, when the public is uninformed of the nature and intent of Soviet perceptions management. The United States is founded on a system of participatory politics which permits and encourages public involvement in decision making. To the benefit of those working

against US policy, that involvement may take the form of protest, both before and after policy has been formulated.[29]

Jean-Francois Revel proposed that democracy "is not basically structured to defend itself against outside enemies seeking its annihilation," particularly when the enemy is a totalitarian government (Revel, 1985, p. 3). He goes on to say that democratic leaders generally fail to understand the threat posed to them by a totalitarian system. The utility of disinformation in defeating democratic efforts to withstand communist expansion is made possible, Revel believes, by the nature of democracy itself.

## 1.  The Nature of Democracy

Former US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has described a democratic government as one "whose rulers are chosen in periodic, competitive elections that feature widespread suffrage, free speech, and free assembly." (Kirkpatrick, 1983, p. 238) Revel views democracy as "a form of society reconciling governmental efficiency with legitimacy, [and] authority with individual freedoms." (Revel, 1985, p. 3) By either definition, American or Western democracy is clearly different from the Soviet totalitarian model of government. The differences between democracy and totalitarianism are a strength and a weakness when confronting Soviet disinformation.

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[29]According to Soviet spokesman Vladimir Posner, in the Soviet Union an individual is not allowed "to conduct a campaign against his own government." (Struck, 1986, p. 3) This is true even in the case of individuals like Dr. Andrei Sakharov, whose "campaign" has consisted of nothing more than criticism of government policy.

The aim of a democracy is to improve the life and system of government for the people, with all segments of society taking an active part in developing and implementing the improvements. Because the democratic system gives rise to an open society, democratic governments are subject to various pressures which totalitarian systems do not face to the same degree.

Internal dissent, conflicting demands by separate groups who may place their own needs above those of others, and the activity of opposing governments whose representatives have easy entrée to the political system all place stress on a democracy and the ability of the government to live up to democratic ideals. A careful balance must be struck in response to internal dissent and Soviet overt or covert efforts to influence policy formation.

Two distinctions are important in this regard: first, the distinction between honest negotiations among governments and diversionary tactics or obfuscation; second, the distinction between honest argument in domestic policy debate and propaganda. In both cases, even as they welcome the former, open societies must be particularly on guard against the latter. (ACDA, 1986, p. 2)

## 2. Strengths Made Weaknesses

The vulnerability of the West to Soviet disinformation increases when what are actually internal strengths are turned against democratic governments by an external opponent. These strengths include (1) the high value placed on public opinion as a factor influencing government policy, (2) the assertion that government exists to

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meet the needs of the people, and (3) the tendency to ascribe demo-cratic ideals and intentions to other governments. All of the preced-ing qualities give democratic governments a balance of humanism and hopefulness that has been sustaining and attractive, yet these same qualities are also an Achilles heel.

The negative consequences of reliance on public opinion and valuing meeting the needs of the people are oversensitivity to con-flicting demands, an inability to reach a consensus on the proper action to take, and difficulty in making a timely response to threaten-ing situations. This inclination to "paralysis" applies not only within individual democracies but also among the democratic alliance as a whole. The negative consequences of ascribing common democratic goals to other governments are confusion and frustration when foreign policy interactions do not proceed as expected.

The essence of mirror-imaging and self-deception lies in "insisting upon seeing and believing what one wants to believe, despite evidence to the contrary." (Kartchner, 1987, pp. 160-161) In a world where not all political systems are based on the democratic ideal of mutually beneficial existence, it is foolish for the United States to engage in mirror-imaging and self-deception.

In some ways, the democratic political system is set up to fail in comparison with other governments. Democracy sets such high ideals for itself, and accepts nothing less than perfect accomplishment of those ideals, that belief in the democratic system becomes hard to maintain. Among democracies, "constant self-condemnation, often

with little or no foundation, is a source of weakness and inferiority." (Revel, 1985, p. 9)  Democratic governments strive for perfection and feel guilty because they are not perfect.  When deception is employed "to project to the democratic world an embellished image of the socialist countries and a blackened picture of the others," the cycle of guilt is reinforced. (Revel, 1985, p. 166)

### 3. Perceptual and Ethical Limitations

A third factor which makes democracies susceptible to Soviet deceptive practices is perceptual and ethical limitations on the way information is processed.  Various authors have proposed that Americans do not readily understand either Soviet motivations or their behavior.  The major reasons given for this are twofold—differing ethics and perceptual bias.  First discussed will be the difference in culture and history, leading to different expectations for proper behavior between the two cultures.[30]

### a. Ethical Differences

Dr. Vladimir Lefebvre, formerly a mathematician for the Soviet Ministry of Defense, is a Soviet emigré who writes on the ethical differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. According to Lefebvre, "Christian [Western] ideology is based on pro-

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[30]For a thorough discussion of cultural effects on Russian/Soviet behavior, see Marquis deCustine, Journey For Our Time, Phillis Penn Kohler, ed. and trans. (London:  Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1951); Ronald Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York:  Charles Scribner and Sons, 1977); and Vladimir A. Lefebvre, Algebra of Conscience:  A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems (Dordrecht, Holland:  D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982).

hibition of evil: [while] Soviet ideology is based on <u>declaration of good</u>." (Lefebvre, 1982, p. 83) This results in two completely different ways of looking at the place of the individual, and the state, in the world. Western ideology is full of prohibitions on what not to do, leading to valuing confrontation between good and evil. At the same time, any compromise of good with evil is regarded as evil. Lefebvre believes that, in a conflict where both parties adhere to this system, both will be motivated to make compromises in order to achieve what both parties can agree on as good.

In Soviet ideology, although there is a declaration of good, "there is no prohibition against perpetrating evil." (Lefebvre, 1982, p. 85) This results in a view of morality where compromise by good toward evil is seen as good. Confrontation between good and evil is regarded as evil. In short, under the "prohibition of evil" system, if a person has difficulty deciding between good and evil, he still may not choose evil. Under the "declaration of good" system, if a person has trouble deciding which action to take, he is not admonished or made to feel guilty if he chooses evil.[31]

The result of disputes under the "declaration of good" system—whether both antagonists believe in the system or not—is that

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[31]Jan Sejna, former secretary of the Czechoslovakian Defense council, recalls General Secretary Khrushchev instructing Warsaw pact leaders that "anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral." (Douglass and Sejna, 1986, p. 24) Khrushchev took his lead from Lenin, who stated, "Our morality is completely subordinated to the class struggle of the proletariat ... everything that is done in the proletarian cause is honest." (Conquest, 187, p. 124)

conflict is valued more than compromise. Because of the lack of a standard against evil held by at least one of the antagonists, compromise for the common good will be difficult to achieve.

In comparing the democratic and communist political systems, Lefebvre's ethical model seems to hold. The failure of the Soviet Union to meet its ideals is routinely dismissed by some observers because the Soviet government rests on an ideology which proclaims that communism will produce good results in the end. At the same time, the United States is routinely criticized for falling short of its ideals because democracy rests on a system that prohibits evil at any stage of development. This artificial double standard is exploited by Soviet directors of perceptions management because the artificiality of it is generally unrecognized by those whose opinions are being influenced against the democratic system.

### b. Perceptual Limitations

A difference in viewpoint on what constitutes ethical behavior on the part of the Soviet Union is an insufficient explanation for the success of communist deception efforts. Another contributing factor in democratic vulnerability to Soviet deception efforts is the way the public, policy makers, and opinion leaders in the West perceive the world around them. This is the tendency of Americans to be biased when forming perceptions of other cultures.

The chief perceptual difficulty that Americans in particular have with Soviet intentions has been mentioned before under the common phrase "mirror imaging." This representative bias, the

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"tendency to perceive other cultures as being similar (representative) to North American culture" is only one of many ways in which our biases of experience and expectation interfere with an objective construction of reality.[32] (Lauren, 1987, p. 104) The difference in ethical systems discussed by Lefebvre has practical consequences in the way perceptions are utilized. When the US and the USSR meet at the negotiating table, not only is the US inclined to reach a compromise where both parties may benefit but the negotiators subconsciously believe that the Soviets want the same thing—mirror imaging. From the Soviet point of view, "the aim of negotiation has never been to reach a lasting agreement but to weaken their adversary and prepare it to make further concessions while fostering his illusion that the new concessions will be the last." (Revel, 1985, p. 350) Agreements that the passage of time shows favored the Soviet position, the readiness to form such agreements, and belief that mutual benefit would occur are the result of mirror imaging.

The United States engages in self-deception where the Soviet Union is concerned by being too ready to believe the worst of itself and the best of the Soviets. Because most democratic policy makers and opinion leaders are more practiced in self criticism than in objective appraisal and criticism of Western and Soviet faults, "it requires no vast effort on the part of the USSR to engage in strategic

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[32]For a concise review of biases and their implications, see Steven Lauren, An Introduction to Problems in Understanding and Predicting Soviet Behavior—A Psychological and Cultural Approach, Masters Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), pp. 17-56.

deception, simply exploiting such predispositions on the part of Westerners." (Ra'anan, 1987, p. 143)

## B. RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION

The responsibility of the United States is to make workable foreign policy in the face of Soviet efforts to deceive opinion leaders, policy makers, and the public about the true goals and intentions of Soviet and Western policy. The USSR experiences continued success in elevating its image at the expense of the West, yet much of the tarnished image of the United States originates in deceptive information. This indicates that information on the workings of Soviet perceptions management is underutilized and misdirected.

### 1. Identification

Identification—bringing Soviet disinformation into the open—is the first step required for the US to turn the tide of psychological war in its favor. As former CIA Director Casey has said,

Our best defense against [active measures] is to tell the truth about the attempt to manipulate us. If people really understand the Soviet use of active measures as a significant instrument of policy, they stand a good chance of not being manipulated. (Casey, 1985, p. 4)

The public, opinion leaders, and politicians all must be educated about the threat and tactics of Soviet disinformation. This education program must originate with the policy makers and needs to include

identification of current Soviet deceptive activity and admission of past mistakes through US self deception.[33]

Because much of Soviet deception surfaces outside the United States, government representatives overseas provide information on developments in Soviet propaganda campaigns. Stanton Burnett of USIA points out that

> USIA posts abroad are often the first U.S. Government people to be aware of forgeries or disinformation. Posts abroad inform USIA, the Section for Policy Guidance, and are provided with data to expose the forgeries. USIA distributes U.S. Government publications on active measures and uses the Voice of America, the Wireless File, TV, and the Foreign Press Center to counter forgeries and other active measures. (Congress, 1985, p. 54)

Numerous organizations in the United States are involved in the effort to identify and counteract the effects of Soviet disinformation. Among them are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). All of these agencies—plus the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Council—are involved in the Interagency Active Measures Working Group established under the State Department's Bureau of

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[33]Alexander Solzhenitsyn points out the gravest of these past mistakes as the Western failure to dictate peace terms to Stalin at the end of World War II. He believes this failure resulted in "one capitulation after another" and a current state of mind which says "give in as quickly as possible, give up as quickly as possible, peace and quiet at any cost." (Solzhenitsyn, 1986, pp. 23-24)

Intelligence and Research in 1981.[34]  According to the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the purpose of the group is to

> counter active measures through a strategy of educating governments, the media, and public opinion as a whole.... the working group has published about 20 or so unclassified reports on active measures-related topics [and has] coordinated numerous sessions with interested journalists that have resulted in highly useful pieces appearing in domestic and foreign media. (Congress, 1985, p. 52)

In 1983, the President announced "that it is necessary to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various aspects of public diplomacy of the United States Government relative to national security." Public diplomacy was defined as "those actions of the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our national security objectives." (Dandar, 1985, p. 41) Since the coordination of public diplomacy efforts, the Chairman of the Working Group feels that their efforts have been

> successful, over time, in raising awareness, in raising consciousness about this problem, particularly among opinion leaders and the media. To the extent that we have made the media more aware than they used to be that this sort of thing does go on, that it is not an absurd idea of ours, they are increasingly inclined to check an incoming, anonymous document far more carefully that they used to be. In that sense, we are able to stifle, to silence, active measures. (Congress, 1985, p. 123)

A major limiting factor in using identification as a response to Soviet disinformation is the impossibility of undoing the damage done by the release of the falsified information.  An FBI spokesman testified

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[34]In October 1986, the State Department gained an office of its own, solely dedicated to the study of active measures:  the Office of Active Measures Analysis and Response.

that "The Soviets believe that even when the United States Government issues prompt denials of the authenticity of a forged document, the denial will never entirely offset the damage done by the initial release." (Congress, 1985, p. 29) The best that can be hoped for is that, as more governments become aware of the disinformation process through identification of bogus materials, later Soviet efforts to use the same techniques will be less successful.

## 2. Increasing Democratic Self-Confidence

The second step in countering Soviet disinformation is to improve the self-confidence of the American public. Jeane Kirkpatrick has pointed out that "the reluctance of the nation's major institutions to take responsibility for the preservation of the society's values and institutions is one of the striking characteristics of American life in the last decade or so." (Kirkpatrick, 1982, p. 240) If insufficient numbers of citizens involve themselves in the processes of government through apathy or belief that the American democratic system is unworthy, then any amount of foreign goodwill and support against Soviet deception will cease to matter.

One of the most vital elements of this step is educating policy makers and the public in a rational foreign policy stance toward the Soviet Union. Alexander Solzhenitsyn has called for an end to Western concessions to Soviet aggression, saying that "only firmness makes it possible to withstand the assaults of Communist totalitarianism." (Solzhenitsyn, 1986, p. 42) Professor Richard Pipes points out that "once the principle has been established that irritating or standing up

to the Soviet Union must be avoided at all costs, no matter how grave the provocation, an important psychological battle has been lost." (Pipes, 1984, p. 68) Organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy are helpful in supporting democratic concepts abroad, but democracy needs strengthening at home also. Unless the crisis of American confidence is addressed, the United States will succumb to the self-doubt and the negative image that Soviet perceptions management is designed to engender.

### 3. Restriction of Soviet Interference in Domestic Politics

In 1965, the Soviet Union began an "offensive against the positions of imperialism," which meant an increase in efforts to legitimize Soviet involvement in crisis "resolution." Foreign Minister Gromyko declared in 1968 that, "during any acute situation, however far away it appears from our country, the Soviet Union's reaction is to be expected in all capitals of the world." (Conquest, 1987, p. 128) By 1971, according to Mr. Gromyko, the assumption of Soviet involvement in world events meant that "there is no question of any significance that can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it." (Pipes, 1984, p. 69) The problem with this point of view for the Western democracies is that the Soviets fully expect their opinion to be solicited and attended to when the President of the United States makes a State of the Union Address, but it is somehow "improper" for the US to comment on Soviet-Eastern Bloc developments. Obviously the Soviets do not consider superpower commentary on domestic

issues to be a two-way street. Each time the West abides by this Soviet restriction, democratic influence in world affairs is diminished.

After identification of instances of Soviet deception and disinformation targeted against the West, and US efforts to strengthen internal support for democratic ideals and practices, the next step in countering disinformation is to restrict the ability of the Soviets to interfere in US domestic politics. The former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs suggests that this is best done by "exposing and removing the foreign instruments of intervention, such as the diplomat who engages in improper activities or the foreign journalist whose position is a cover for disinformation activities." (Eagleburger, 1983, p. 11)

One of the top Soviet espionage priorities is "access to U.S. national decision making." The Soviets are helped in this effort by the openness of the democratic process and by their estimated "1,400 full-time Soviet Bloc intelligence officers under "legal" covers as diplomats, trade-mission officials, U.N. employees, and journalists." (Rees, 1985, p. 14) All of these individuals are allowed to travel within the United States with very few restrictions, making contact with influential businessmen and legislators along the way. Professor Pipes has proposed that "the West should instantly close ranks whenever the Soviet Union attempts to take sides in [alliance or domestic politics]." (Pipes, 1984, p. 247) Given the value attached to intraparty or alliance debate, however, the possibility of such a closing of ranks is slim. A much more useful way to reduce Soviet ability to

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involve themselves in Western policy making is the expulsion of excess Soviet personnel in "support" roles in the United States and expulsion of Soviets found to be engaging in espionage. Limiting the number of Soviets able to target legislators and other leaders, along with education to make target groups for Soviet cooption (the media, activists) aware of their utility as "unwitting agents," should work to reduce Soviet effectiveness in political intervention.

## C. THE CHALLENGE OF *GLASNOST*

The United States has a 70-year history of political dealings with the Soviet Union and has come belatedly to realize that "the Soviets take a long-term view ... that the cumulative impact of active measures makes their considerable investment worthwhile." (Congress, 1985, p. 45) Serious effort has been made during the past decade to observe and understand the Soviet philosophy and practice of perceptions management, but the process under study continues to evolve. As the public relations policy of the USSR changes, the United States must continue to keep the goals of Soviet perceptions management in mind.

One of the greatest challenges facing American foreign policy with respect to the Soviet Union is the question of how to respond to General Secretary Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*. Gorbachev made a plea upon his election for "speeding up the country's social and economic development.... The point at issue is restructuring the material and technical base of production." (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 386) On the domestic scene, "the party regards the further perfection and

development of democracy, of the entire system of socialist self-government of the people as one of the vital tasks of domestic policy." (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 387)

Closely related to the issue of the role disinformation may play in *glasnost* is the admonition that

> We must still further develop publicity in the work of party, state, government and public organizations.... The better informed the people, the more consciously they act, the more actively they support the party and its plans and programmatic objectives. (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 387)

As journalist Robert Kaiser points out, "The new policy of *glasnost* (openness) and the call for *perestroika* (restructuring) are tactics intended to revive the system, not admissions of failure." (Kaiser, 1986-87, p. 244) Gorbachev is unlikely to believe that the Soviet system has failed or is doomed to failure; rather his position is one of pointing out and correcting faults so that the Soviet Union may "become still more rich and powerful and for the creative forces of socialism to reveal themselves even more fully." (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 388)

All of the above is *glasnost*, the new Soviet image formally announced to the Western world at Gorbachev's ascension to power. *Glasnost* is intended to indicate a new openness within the Soviet Union, to lead to strengthening of the Soviet economy, and to indicate willingness to negotiate with the West for mutually satisfactory resolution of differences. Western negotiators have not yet seen the types of substantive changes that would give life to the "openness" of *glasnost*. Democratic governments must realize, however, that openness will be

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selective, that negotiations will still be selective. The CPSU will retain totalitarian control of the USSR and a totalitarian approach to relations with other governments during this "development of democracy." The new General Secretary has clearly said that, "the solution of the complex tasks we are faced with presupposes a further strengthening of the party and the enhancement of its organizing and guiding role." (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 387)

*Glasnost,* rather than being a new approach in external relations, is the latest manifestation of the Leninist directive to "tell the West what they want to hear, meanwhile strengthen your position." Changes are being made within the Soviet Union under *glasnost*— people are encouraged to criticize their senior comrades and the economy is improving— but qualified openness has been seen before under different Soviet rulers. Changes in East-West relations are, as yet, cosmetic. It has been said that "Gorbachev brings a new verve and style to Soviet foreign policy. Many years after they might have, the Soviets have finally learned the tricks of public relations." (Kaiser, 1986-87, p. 251)

The challenge to democratic governments today is to separate the wheat from the chaff of *glasnost.* We can not afford to believe the 1980s' "New Soviet Man" to such an extent that we sacrifice our caution in the face of continuing Soviet intentions to export their form of government. Communist spokesmen were quick to make it clear in TASS and Pravda that, regardless of the appointment of a new general secretary,

building the new society and improving developed socialism is inconceivable without the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party.... [The CPSU] is following unflaggingly the road charted by Lenin and will never deviate from that road. (FBIS, 1985, p. R12; *ibid.*, p. R3)

The democracies should not expect a lessening of the East-West competition because information on domestic problems of the Soviet Union is being released and a friendlier face is being worn by the spokesmen who transmit Soviet policy and intentions.

Taking advantage of the opportunity *glasnost* provides for improved relations with the Soviet Union is equally as important as remaining cautious. What the West should look for from this new openness is a decrease in the application of perceptions management practices against the US and her allies, a willingness to make concessions in negotiations without the requirement for the West to make the first move, and Soviet adherence to previously negotiated treaties and agreements. Without moves in these directions by the Soviets, *glasnost* will remain a hollow promise of change.

## D. SUMMARY

In considering foreign policy and the potential to be misled through disinformation, it is ironic that the strengths of democracy are also its weaknesses. The West has become its own worst enemy through the habit of believing negative things about the democratic system of government more readily than it even questions the professed world view and intentions of the Soviet Union. Although an open society has shown itself to be strong, vibrant, and adaptable, the

open nature of democracy is a hindrance when trying to prevent Soviet utilization of the participatory politics model.

In countering Soviet disinformation, the West must learn to prevent its effects rather than simply responding to Soviet initiatives. A basic preventative is the admission that ignorance and minimization of Soviet disinformation threatens the functioning of democracy. Democratic governments and peoples must give up their cherished view of the world as filled with other reasonable governments and people who will respond to reason "just like us." The events of history show that the Soviet Union does not reason just like the West, and there is no reason to expect her leaders to do so. Accommodating the reality of disinformation as factor in US-Soviet interaction requires walking a tightrope between too cynical a view and a too hopeful a one. To expect that the USSR will never change its aggressive foreign policy would be just as crippling as to abandon seeking ways to meet the challenge of Soviet ideological warfare on Western terms. A middle ground must be found. Democracies need to welcome new opportunities for better relations such as *glasnost* yet remain cautious enough to base their hopefulness and compromises on concrete actions by the Soviets rather than words.

The response of the West to Soviet disinformation has been slow to organize and faces the challenge of an adversary network that is extensive and well practiced. Despite these difficulties, improvements are taking place in the awareness of Soviet deception techniques by influential Americans and US allies. In responding to disinformation,

it is vitally important that the United States not resort to Soviet tactics of spreading lies in an effort to improve its image abroad and at home. The coordinator of USIA efforts against Soviet active measures has said, "we believe we can defeat forgeries and disinformation by truth. We do not spread disinformation as a weapon ourselves, in part for the moral reasons, but in part also for the very practical reason, that we are very proud of and jealous of our credibility." (Congress, 1985, p. 112) This approach of truthfulness may be the only one democracy can bear.

# VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet Union and the United States are involved in an ideological battle in support of their foreign policies and ways of government. The chief tool used by the Soviet Union is negative disinformation about the policies and intentions of the US and positive disinformation about he policies and intentions of the USSR. At stake in what the United States Information Agency calls the "war of ideas" is the positive opinion and support of foreign and domestic audiences. This battle is a long-acknowledged one on the part of the Soviet Union but is only partially understood and sporadically embraced by the United States. From the point of view of the US government, perceptions management on a broad scale is something to be attempted only in time of war.

The greatest aids to the Soviets in the ideological war are their unified and offensive position and lack of awareness in the West, both as to the magnitude of their effort and their true goals. The Soviet practice is to be on the offensive against democratic governments—trying to keep the US and her allies engaged in response to, or suspicion of, alleged democratic wrongdoing. The direction of deceptive campaigns against US foreign policy originates at the highest level of the Soviet power structure, within the Politburo. With the authority of the Politburo, government agencies such as the Propaganda Department, the International Department, and the Committee for State

Security present a united front of anti-US disinformation and covert active measures operations. Combining the work of these agencies with the deceptive statements of Soviet policy makers ensures that the channels for perceptions management are many, varied, and far-reaching.

Equally important is the fact that public opinion in the Soviet Union does not affect government actions and decision making. The Soviet leadership is free to attack Western behavior without being held internally accountable in any meaningful way for what they themselves say or do. Under the Soviet system of totalitarian communism, Marxist–Leninist ideology is used to justify every decision on the part of the Kremlin leadership. The Soviet people are taught that their leadership and cause are infallible, and dissension is swiftly and consistently punished. These factors severely limit informed public participation in Soviet government, and protest concerning Kremlin policy has come to be out of the question.

The Soviet propensity for deception makes foreign policy relations with them extremely difficult. In the absence of evidence that the Soviet Union will soon change its deceptive practices, the West must continue efforts to be aware of, advertise, and confront deception, yet at the same time remain ready to take advantage of true Soviet openness. The continued security of the United States depends heavily upon increased awareness and effective countering of Soviet efforts to deceive the public, opinion leaders, and policy makers. The Kremlin will continue to take advantage of any divisions or

complacency among democratic governments. Kremlin leaders are experienced in efforts to manage how others perceive them. The strength of the West, and of the US in particular, is that the democracies are slowly becoming more aware of the importance of freeing themselves from the Soviet-imposed point of view.

A fundamental task in reducing Western susceptibility to deception is to acknowledge that democracy is not perfect and neither is communism. Lacking a utopia of either kind, the prudent method of comparison is to judge the opposing systems on their practices today, in the real world. In order to do that, the West must part the curtain of deception and ignorance through which it regards the Soviet Union. The United States public and private sectors need to devote more effort to study of the Soviet Union. In addition, the history and recent instances of Soviet deception against the United States, maintained primarily by the US government, should be widely distributed, not just to allied governments but also to the US public. The free public must realize the magnitude of the Soviet deception effort. Only then will it be possible to place in perspective Soviet involvement in past and future world events.

Eventually, suspicion and hostility must be replaced with greater understanding and trust by both parties or the United States and the Soviet Union will not reach their full potential. Confidence and investment in the democratic system of government must be demonstrated by democratic policy makers. So must a less naïve approach to the USSR. In this period of potential change in the Soviet Union

towards openness about its past faults and present deficiencies, the West must avoid automatic skepticism of everything Soviet. Deception on the part of the Soviet Union against US interests should not be believed in as an absolute for all future relations. Neither should continuing deception be ignored in the quest for better relations. The West must stop seeing the hope of foreign policy moderation in Soviet words when corresponding action is lacking. To tell the truth loudly and clearly about Soviet manipulation is the first step in minimizing the effects and utility of Soviet perceptions management.

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